Edging out Philosophy?: the effect of fear on the modern anti-terrorism discourse

Introduction: “The place and status of fear”
In the Crito, a philosophical dialogue by Plato, Socrates recounts the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur. Firmly living by the guiding philosophy that it is “better to suffer than to do wrong,” Socrates refused to slay the Minotaur, a “monster of greed and violence.” However, known for being ‘cool under pressure,’ the stability of a Socratic answer is not always available in the heat of the moment. Fear, especially collective fear, often overrides a healthy philosophical scepticism and distorts the essence of an issue. Socrates’ just response to the monster was to “address the hidden cause of the Monstrous, rather than simply [slay] the beast;” a good philosophical starting point for discussions about terror and philosophy. (Kearney, 24)
As the academic community experiences, examines, and contributes to the shaping of a post-9/11 world, a clear philosophical point of view, as divorced from fear as possible, is an increasingly helpful perspective. The vast majority of the philosophical debate surrounding anti-terror laws is concerned with divining an appropriate mixture of liberty and security. Always a balance, as few would seriously argue for anarchy (total liberty) or the harshest imaginable police state (total security), the discussion focuses on degrees of both liberty and security. (Waldron, 2) While an exceedingly useful discussion to have, diametrically opposing liberty and security has yet to achieve a position with the singular clarity of a Socratic philosophy. Thus, this paper seeks to focus on the effects of fear as a hidden issue underpinning all anti-terrorism discussions. Engaging in a philosophical analysis of the place and status of fear in the modern discourse about liberty and security, this paper will explore the two types of fear that terrorism produces, and thus show that negating the existence of fear is an extremely problematic position for the liberal state.

“The aesthetics of fear:”
If fear is based in public perception, then both perpetrators of terrorist acts and the trappings of a modern political state are playing a part in feeding our collective fears. Robert Nozick has noted that the institutions of modern culture, media, society, and politics have been coloured by an “us versus them” framing of the issue of terrorism. His categorization of modernity as being an age of ‘general anticipatory fear’ is a notion with important political ramifications. This age is described as being one of no imminent danger, but rather a general fear that “never ends, never starts, is always present like gravity.” (Fisher) In this state, engaging in the issues surrounding global terrorism in a fear-free manner remains a theoretical dream. Both champions of liberty and defenders of security have cultivated their own variety of fear—there is no longer only one Minotaur, but each side has an army of different Minotaurs. It could be argued that the modern aesthetics of fear are to blame, if not for the existence of terrorist acts, then for helping the current climate of discussion-stifling fear spiral out of control. (Fisher)

“Two types of fear:”
If that is true, then it should be said that the most important denouement of the 9/11 attacks is a heightened sense of fear on an individual, national, and international scale. While there are likely few people who would profess to have less fear now than on September 10th, 2001, different groups of people fear different things. Understanding the omnipresent nature of the aesthetics of fear, this dialogue will focus on two types of fear: fear of the state’s response to terrorism—manifested in a fear of losing one’s rights, and fear of terrorism itself—manifested in a fear of losing one’s security.

“Fear of losing one’s rights:”
For non-utilitarians, “rights appear practically impervious to social utility arguments” which would see civil liberties fall prey to heightened security threats. (Meisels, 1) While civil rights are rarely thought of as this absolute (Meisels, 2; Waldron, 10), different circumstances carry varying thresholds, or combinations of liberty and security. There are those who fear the “need to know” and its resulting paranoia-induced restriction of liberties at the legislative or policy levels. (Cohen, 11) Those who feel this way are most likely to worry about increasing the powers of the state in response to the unquantifiable sense of fear. How much fear must be felt before one gives up particular rights, and can society accurately measure this intersection? Philosopher Walter Gelhorn described the fear of being tricked into “surrendering one after another bastion [of liberty] in a heedless quest for an unattainably perfect security.” (Cohen, 12) That is to say, there will always be the potential for someone to use his or her rights to abuse the rights of others. It is merely a question of how much abuse is enough to justify a reigning in of civil liberties.
Jeremy Waldron’s apprehensive political realism asserts that, even given the complex nature of a liberty v. security debate, any adjustment in rights requires “structured arguments for their justification.” (Waldron, 10) In that sense, a “peremptory use of the balancing idea” in favour of security must be coupled with more than a consequentialist argument; in fact, there must be a full unpacking of possible reasons. (Waldron, 10) Until then, the loss of rights is predicated on fear, not a philosophical point of view or a clear argument. This leaves the door open for the Hobbesian hypothesis of “war of all against all” to gain footing in the political debate. While it may seem far-fetched to liken the modern era to Hobbes’ theoretical state of nature, it can certainly be argued that terrorism “threatens the future of a political society” in a substantial way. (Meisels, 8) Perhaps it is our fear-based response to terrorism that is the real threat.

“Fear of losing one’s security:”
While there are those who fear the expansion of governmental powers and the ensuing loss of civil liberties, there are also those who fear that “restricting the sovereign will render him incapable of protecting our right to life.” (Meisels, 4) In the Hobbesian sense of self-preservation, the right to life is, indeed, of paramount importance. Yet, does the fear of losing one’s life to a terrorist attack truly correspond to the likelihood of that happening to each individual who experiences such fear? Statistically, of course not. Even so, the “ultimate usefulness of fear for a theory of political life increases within modernity,” and so, is used as a tool. After all, has civilization not been one giant exercise in a “net reduction of local experiential fear”—an attempt to minimize exposure to danger? (Fisher) Philip Fisher argues that fear is a reciprocal uncertainty; a mutual, but not shared, fear of the other. (Fisher) It is precisely the uncertain nature of the threat posed by ‘the other’ which, some argue, necessitates a tightening of security restrictions.
If liberalism is born of “apprehension about what may be done to us using the overwhelming means of force available to the state,” then the converse position is born out of fear of the absence of the state. (Meisels, 2) In the post-9/11 world, the American government has engaged in a global ‘war on terror,’ designed to create a true and permanent sense of state-maintained security. In President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, he said “We can’t stop short…it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.” (Bush, 3) Interestingly, the speech—a framing of modern philosophy, if you will—did not refer to fear, except to say that the American people would not be broken by it. (Bush, 6) Instead, the prevailing philosophy based the desire for increased security on the “defence of liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.” (Bush, 7) Unfortunately, as the six years since that speech have shown, merely addressing the issue of security does little to mitigate the existence of fear, and fear breeds insecurity.

“Conclusion: the Effect of Fear”
If both those who fear an overly strong government and those who fear weak government remain afraid, in spite of the changes since 9/11, it begs the question: why is the current discourse not focused on the culture of fear? Richard Posner argues that asking the ‘war on terror’ to mould itself to existing civil liberties is to deny the changing scope of civil rights throughout history. (Posner) Can overreacting out of fear truly be prevented without the benefit of hindsight? It seems that those who believe that focusing on security achieves a “minimal net decrease in our civil liberties,” have lost a measure of the scepticism which is an integral feature of a liberal society. Fear, without a clear philosophy to guide decisions, has historically led to a tightening of civil liberties in the name of security. It is the presence of fear—both fear of the powers of the state and fear of losing one’s security—that acts as a lubricating mechanism, allowing the public debate to easily ignore the need for a foundation built upon a philosophy that remains relevant in the presence and absence of fear.
If terrorist acts cause terror, the ultimate form of fear, then terror is bred out of fear. Fear that once the state is given one liberty, they will be able to take them all; (Cohen, 11, 15) fear that not responding at all will harm both security and liberty. Then what is the answer? How far does the fundamental need for security extend? If part of one’s civil liberties includes taking some of the burden of security upon one’s self, where is that line to be drawn? This paper has not focused on the balance between liberty and security inasmuch as it has examined the monster of fear on both sides of the debate. The effects of fear are pervasive; some argue that “fear destroys freedom” and that fear feeds upon fear. (Baruchello, 304) In that sense, it is fear which acts as a magnifying mechanism, increasing both the need to ‘do something,’ and the likelihood that whatever is done will not be justified according to any essential philosophical perspective. Rather, it will be a reactionary response to the moment, which hardly bodes well for the influence of philosophical theory in the modern discourse.

Sources:
Baruchello, Giorgio. “Cesare Beccaria and the cruelty of liberalism: An essay on liberalism of fear and its limits.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Vol. 30, 3, 303-313.

Bush, President George W. “State of the Union Address.” The United States Capitol. 29 January 2002. <>.

Cohen, Stanley A. "Liberty and Security - Can We Have Both?" A paper prepared for the conference of the International Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law on “Technology and Its Effects on Criminal Responsibility, Security and Criminal Justice”, Charleston, South Carolina, December 10, 2002.

Fisher, Philip. Raritan. New Brunswick: Summer 1998. Vol. 18, Iss. 1; pgs. 40-73.

Kearney, Richard. “Terror, philosophy and the sublime: Some philosophical reflections on 11 September.” Philosophy Social Criticism 2003, 29, 23. .

Meisels, Tamar. “How Terrorism Upsets Liberty.” Political Studies, 2005, vol. 53, 162-181.

Posner, Richard A. "Security Versus Civil Liberties," Atlantic Monthly, vol. 288, no. 5 (December 2001), pp. 46-8.