Thomas Hobbes introduced the social contract philosophy: Inhabiting a civil society obliges rules that naturally relinquish some freedoms. Rules are mandatory for one to inhabit oneself in a civil society, at the cost of sacrifices. However, it calls for scarifies to be made, naturally.
Inherent to a free and democratic society, the cherished privacy legislation endows the individual with certain rights and responsibilities, and establishes rules and guidelines for the ways in which public and private sector organizations are permitted to interact. Applicable to this case in how they are allowed to deal with the personal information collected on individuals and groups within the society so as to not compromise their protections from the “prying eyes of government.”
Endemic to all privacy laws are a set of reasonable information practices that set the boundaries for protection of the individual while also allowing a certain latitude for organizations to use personal information when necessary and allocated by law. Scholars argue that privacy is a core value in liberal, democratic societies and that privacy is deemed as a fundamental human right.
Likewise, the terrorism threat called for enhanced security protections called for fundamental rights and freedoms to be basically be revamped to better improve public safety and to combat terrorism. The question is how much security is needed, and to what extent are we willing to allow some slippage of our privacy rights? The tension between the duty of government to protect citizens from external threats and the human right to privacy threatens to encroach on political traditions and constitution guarantees.
To ensure some personal security, Thomas Hobbes argued the exchange of promises that entails citizens to cede some their liberties and freedoms in exchange for their protection and security by a political authority, where breach of contract by either party would render it void. This social contract is based on Human State of Nature—how we naturally are, not how we ought to be—=making it necessary to stifle such tendency by means of enforced rules.
This logic can be applied here with respect to the anti-terrorism act.
The right to privacy is predicated on trust and confidence between the citizenry and government. The particular security measure that Riley discusses is related to the surveillance venue—data collection to identify terrorists or potential terrorists.
The fundamental issue in the arena of privacy pertains to the way that personal information “is collected, distributed, shared, and used by public and private institutes alike.” Scholars argue that privacy is a core value in liberal, democratic societies; and that privacy is deemed as a fundamental inherent human right.
But, it is not only the legalities that are troublesome, it is also the way information is gathered; and, the way technologies have advanced to transcend distance, time and space. Changes from data entry to automatic-collection perpetuates to a habitual exercise of compiling information. Databases can be stored, retrieved, combined and used under different contexts where it never meant anything before, along with their portable, immense storage capabilities. It is evident that such innovations have engulfed within them, the potential for the erosion of privacy to a degree previously could not have envisaged (during the formative stages of its development).
Data is collected for future use, so actions are liable to be reinterpreted differently. The reinterpretation of particular actions and behaviors as wrongful are groundless decisions to identify who to watch. In addition, the pre-emptive approach enables governments around the world to oversee people in number of ways at their own discretion. The surveillance of suspects has morphed to the surveillance of all. It begs to wonder, If it is not about the legal elements, then it is not about you, and certainly not about your safety and security.
LEGAL DIMENSION:
The Anti-Terrorism Act is legitimized under the umbrella of national security. The side effect is that it frustrates the fundamental human rights to the extent that civil liberty infringements suddenly seem miniscule in comparison to the necessity to invoke the government’s duty to protect their citizens in the ‘war on terrorism’ threat.
Despite the possible inducements that the United States may allude to, it remains unclear whether this actually comes to fruition. It is more of a symbolic recognition. Also, though the UN CTC advocates and supports this bill, the most profound influence comes from the US.
Regarding: Tension between Democracy versus Security versus Freedom
Whitaker’s article went into the ramifications of the United States government’s crusade to spread democracy around the world. The article was touched upon the rationale behind it being the lack of political freedom accentuates emergence of terrorist and extremists. The article could have delved into more details on the strategy condoning their campaign to spread democracy. For instance, it has been argued that promoting democracy on the part of the U.S. is a ‘soft’ instrument to ever so gently impose their influence—the power to shape new statesmen in the their own image.
Though not directly stated in the article: Therein lies the hypocrisy in the US’s encouragement for democracy, because they find, “it necessary to work closely in the struggle against terrorism with friendly authoritarian regimes…” (Whitaker, p.1017).
The attraction towards Authoritarian governments was their readily conformity to sanction the Anti-Terrorism bill. Never mind their own agenda to manipulate its application to their benefit. They exploited it as a tool for their own political gain. This finely crafted smoke screen is a departure from the democratic practices itself—empowering them to embody the very hallmarks of past authoritarian practices, proliferating the might of their reign. Still, security precautions trumped democratic practices while simultaneously trampling on fundamental human rights.
Nonetheless, newer democratic countries embraced their new found freedoms and protest against restrictions on their personal liberties. In fact, political activism directed towards the US for their national security measures began to grow as citizens learn about the ramifications of the Patriot Act comprising human rights and freedoms.
Though, “Anti-Terrorism legislation can actually foster civil society engagement and debate.” (Whitaker, p.1028), it runs the risk of back-firing against the US. Here, democracy prevails but at the cost of antagonizing against US promoted Anti-Terrorism Act, i.e. national security measures may be compromised in the interest of human rights. To complicate matters, internationally, nations and organizations historically have been unable to agree on a definition of terrorism, let alone the provisions it would entail, since one person’s terrorist is often another person’s freedom fighter. To circumvent this political constraint, countries have taken the approach of enacting laws or negotiating conventions, which criminalize specific acts such as kidnapping, donating bombs, or hijacking airplanes.
In the Canadian context, the Anti-Terrorism Act provoked heated debate and controversy, which ensued because the Liberal Government at the time fast-tracked it to its enactment. The anti-terrorism rules became law on December 19, 2001, in the chaotic aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States. The rules were known as the Anti-Terrorism Act. The Conservative government has tried to paint the Liberals as hypocritical and weak on terrorism for refusing to extend certain provisions tightening the strictness in the name of national security. The Conservatives accused the Liberals as soft on terrorism by their wishy-washy approach to a law that they had written themselves. The Liberals were staunch in their position that the curtailment of civil liberties should only be justified under emergency provisions, when public safety absolutely necessitates for it.
This exemplifies the potential for progress, as the need to engage in passionate debate to seek actions for change. Such dialogue exposes possible unintended detrimental effects of such a rash entrenched law. Most importantly, citizens must actively contest provisions that impugn on their liberty and security. It is imperative that a healthy tension is maintained between governments and the “official opposition,” that is, the public who are q willing to challenge and debate the issues. In this way, a balance between the need for strong but effective security laws will be counterbalance by equally strong privacy and freedom of information guarantees.
Bibliography
Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand. Allied Against Terrorism: What's Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2006), pp. 67-87.
Whitaker, Beth Elise. "Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the 'War on Terror' in the Third World," Third World Quarterly, vol.28, no. 5 (2007), pp. 1017-32.
Monday, March 3, 2008
Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the Third World: Shift to Political Opportunism?
It is not a secret that the United States of America, as a political and economic entity, carries impressive influence over the decision making power in countries across the globe. Ever since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has coordinated an international “war on terror,” requesting the legislative support of all countries in the form of new anti-terrorism laws. However, there have been mixed responses, with some countries unwilling to pass the necessary legislation, despite pressure from the U.S. Especially in the Third World, the focus and goals of anti-terrorism laws have shifted away from global peace and security to political “brown-nosing” and situational opportunism. The reasons for this shift are based largely on the facts that terrorism is not as much of a priority in their societies as compared to the U.S., they receive nothing tangible in exchange for cooperation, and because sentiments on reduced liberties are regionally sensitive.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but rather, it has been magnified since the Twin Towers in New York collapsed in 2001. Third World countries are not unfamiliar with terrorism; however, they most likely have other more pressing issues at the forefront. In their book, Allied Against Terrorism: What’s Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment, Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand claim that despite recent local terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002 that resulted in hundreds of deaths, citizens in Kenya are still inclined to view terrorism as a Western problem (Millar and Rosand 2006). A major factor in their evaluation is that their country has been ravaged by HIV/AIDS and violent street crime (Millar and Rosand 2006). In the overall picture, the effects of the latter problems are more far-reaching than terrorist attacks, and produce far more victims. As a result, the popular opinion within society is that resources should be allocated to address the greatest of society’s problems, a decision that seems like common sense. Consequently, when governments decide that anti-terrorism is an issue, many citizens view the measures as requirements imposed by the Bush administration rather than for the betterment of the country (Whitaker 2007).
However, the idea of terrorism as a Western problem may produce an unfounded sense of security within Third World countries. For example, Morocco, a country viewed as a less likely target for terrorism, did not use any substantial measures to address terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 (Whitaker 2007). Official UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) reports during this period reveal that there was no urgency to change existing laws or enact new ones in order to ensure security (Whitaker 2007). However, on May 16, 2003, more than 40 people were killed when suicide bombers attacked five different sites in Casablanca within a period of thirty minutes (Whitaker 2007). As a result, the Moroccan government enacted sweeping counter-terrorism legislation and arrested thousands of suspected militants (Whitaker 2007). Therefore, terrorism jumped up on their list of priorities once they experienced this “Western problem”. This is where the dilemma lies. In many Third World countries, they can only afford to allocate resources to their major societal issues. Terrorism, until it is actively experienced on a grand scale within the country, will not be considered one of society’s major issues, unlike First World countries. Unfortunately, this may lead to other incidents like the Moroccan example.
Without the influence and persuasion of the United States, many Third World countries might not have passed anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11 (excluding situations like Morocco). Therefore, there must be a political agenda surrounding these decisions. In most cases, these measures are seen as a method of winning favour with the U.S. (Whitaker 2007) In other words, it appears that national security is sometimes not the basis of anti-terrorism legislation in the Third World. So the question becomes what they are receiving in exchange for their loyal support of the ‘war on terror’. According to Whitaker, the presence or absence of counter terrorism measures do not have a significant impact on U.S. economic and military support (Whitaker 2007). However, for their cooperation, countries receive symbolic recognition from the United States which is actually more important than it seems. Future considerations and positive bilateral relations with America may lead to numerous benefits including increased tourism, aid, and assistance during future crises.
On the other hand, reluctance to pass anti-terrorism laws can have repercussions. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, the US ambassador gave a warning about possible reductions in American investment unless the anti-terrorism bill passed (Whitaker 2007). As mentioned, this might not materialize into anything past rhetoric and empty warnings, but uncooperative attitudes will not be forgotten. For many countries which will probably rely on American assistance in the future, they cannot afford to risk possible negative relations with the most powerful country in the world. The governments believe that the public outcry against reduced liberties does not outweigh the possible risk of alienating themselves from the U.S. Therefore, the main purpose of the new legislation is for political benefits rather than for the security of the nation. This does not discount the fact that counter-terrorist laws do increase national security, but the question is, “would they have enacted the anti-terrorism legislation if, instead of the United States, it was Canada pressuring them?” In other words, “would terrorism be a major priority if there was no American influence?”
Lastly, public sentiment on reduced liberties is regionally sensitive, especially in Third World countries. For example, the end of apartheid and the country’s first multiracial elections in 1994 are still fresh in the minds of South Africans (Whitaker 2007). As a result, they are very cautious about legal measures to restrict their civil liberties. Especially in newly formed democracies, a slight shift toward more government authority could slide farther toward authoritarian rule. Under such a regime, unlawful arrests, police seizures and human rights abuses would be commonplace, experiences that are too familiar to the people of South Africa (Whitaker 2007). On the other hand, anti-terrorism bills have faced minimal opposition in countries where there has not been recent political empowerment (Whitaker 2007). Therefore, the reception of anti-terrorism will vary from country to country, depending on social, political and cultural history.
The governments of Third World countries can use the public opinion of anti-terrorist legislation for their own political ends. In countries where citizens believe the United States is responsible for new counter-terrorism laws, the ruling parties may use that belief to their advantage. This can be done to “avoid criticism and deflect blame” because the U.S. will not get much credit for preventing terrorist activities, but when human rights and civil liberties are violated, American influence will be blamed (Whitaker 2007). This way, the government can hold three benefits: avoid the possible ensuing public outcry against anti-terrorism laws, take credit for successful anti-terrorism operations, and gain favor with the U.S. for enacting the legislation.
It is becoming clear that in the Third World, countries are looking for other benefits from anti-terrorism legislation apart from protecting its citizens. The reasons are because terrorism is not as much of a priority in their societies as compared to the U.S., they receive nothing tangible in exchange for cooperation, and because sentiments on reduced liberties are regionally sensitive. Whether this is desirable for the Americans’ ‘war on terror’ remains to be seen. In any case, it is a good study into the international influence of the U.S.
Bibliography
Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand. Allied Against Terrorism: What's Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2006), pp. 67-87.
Whitaker, Beth Elise. "Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the 'War on Terror' in the Third World," Third World Quarterly, vol.28, no. 5 (2007), pp. 1017-32.
The Right to Information
The debate of Anti-Terrorism Legislation has generally focused on the aspects which restricts the physical liberties of citizens (i.e. indefinite detention) or the weakening of procedural justice (i.e. delay in the right to meet an advocate). While those aspects are worrisome, the popular media tends to downplay the significance of the shift in the government’s claim for access to information; and its related view on the appropriate level of privacy for its citizens. This post will first examine the evolution of the popular understanding of privacy (with particular focus on the impact of technological advancement), the impact of the ‘War on Terror’ and anti-terrorism program (which includes all governmental initiatives) on a liberal democratic governments’ understanding of privacy, and compare the difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes in relations to the anti-terrorism program.
The focus of this post is on the government’s conception of privacy, in particular, its relationship to personal relations. Thomas Riley’s article “Security vs. Privacy: A Comparative Analysis of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States” demonstrates that significant changes has occurred in this relationship due to the Anti-Terrorism program. Riley argues that there has been significant shift in the respective government’s perspective towards security at the expense of privacy. In an extensive catalogue of legislative programs, surveillance improvements, and programs, Riley demonstrates the impact of the anti-terrorism program on the citizens’ privacy. The article’s main weakness is that it fails to acknowledge the shift in the general understanding of privacy prior to the anti-terrorism program.
Riley's analysis of privacy and security portrays privacy as the dependent variable of security. While Riley acknowledges that September 11th drove up the demand for surveillance (and analysis) technology (Riley 2007, 3), he undervalues pre-September 11th technological advances and its effect on the understanding of privacy. Prior to September 11th, 2001, the development of the Internet, and other communications advancements, has shifted the cost-benefit calculations of citizens (especially those in developed economies). By the late 90's, it was general knowledge that the ability to track a person's browsing history by internet service providers (ISPs) existed (Oakes 2000).
The benefit offered by the Internet, however, offsets the cost of possible discovery of one's browsing history (as seen by the exponential growth in internet usage). The ability to maintain massive databases and efficient search capabilities made the possibility of data-sharing possible. The development of the ability to track one's browsing history shifted the understanding of privacy from banning the government actively seeking information (since collection of such data was done by businesses) to providing the proper checks and balances for government to accessing the documents collected by the companies.
This shift, from preventing the creation of a database of personal information to regulating its access by government official, is a dynamic that occurred before the September 11th and is important to the context of the current debate. Riley’s conception of a continuum, where security and privacy represent the two poles fails to capture the dynamic within the understanding of privacy. The debate over the limits of employing data-mining technique as opposed to the creation of data-mining capabilities is representative of this change. The latter debate was circumvented by the technological advances made prior to the anti-terrorism program.
The impact of technology does not overshadow the impact of the shock of terrorism on the debate, in the short run. There is no doubt that the events of September 11th have had a huge impact on the debate between security and privacy, but the changes in technological advances paved the way for the current debate. It is because of the changing understanding of privacy, triggered by technological advance, that the internal shift in the government’s understanding of its relation to information is obscured.
Prior to the anti-terrorism legislation, the government only had the ability to access personal information with appropriate, and adequate, reason. Generally speaking, there is a judicial evaluation of the reason and the bar set for access is relatively strenuous. The anti-terrorism legislation changes that by providing a general reason, the prevention of terrorist acts that authorizes the government to access a wide range of information; furthermore, the legislation generally moves the judicial component from gate-keeper to ex post facto overseer. The legislation removes the burden on the government to provide specific rational to access relevant information. The government’s specific burden has been replaced by a general rationale, combating terrorism, to justify access to wide range of information.
This shift from the government being required to have specific evidence against specific target for access to information to being required to have neither specific evidence nor targets to access information has clearly manifested in some of the anti-terrorist programs proposed by the US. The proposed Terrorism and Information Planning System (TIPS) is a prime example of the new understanding. TIPS was a program which proposed to recruit citizens would have access to other people’s property (i.e. mailman, cable maintenance workers) to report suspicious activity. The shift from specific to general also occurred in the informant recruitment process. Whereas before the anti-terrorism program specific informants were sought out for specific targets, TIPS proposed a general recruitment (up to 10 million informants in the pilot project alone). Its fundamental premise is that the general reason of preventing terrorism was adequate to infringe on the right of individuals to privacy.
The shift is alarming for liberal democracies because the difference in the government’s right to individual’s information is a distinguishing trait between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. The shift from specific to general is symptomatic of a general shift towards authoritarian tendencies. Authoritarian regimes lays claim to all information, and results in a lack of respect for the privacy of the people. The anti-terrorism legislation shifts liberal democratic governments into this area. This is especially apparent when one considers the length of time it takes for authoritarian regimes to establish (per UN Security Council regulations) anti-terrorist legislation.
Whitaker, in “Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the War on Terror in the Third World”, notes that authoritarian regimes have a significantly easier time implementing anti-terrorist legislation than democratic regimes (Whitaker 2007). This is because there is very little substantive change by implementing the Anti-Terrorist Legislation within authoritarian regimes. The ease experienced by authoritarian regimes in adopting anti-terrorism legislation, aside from the lack of procedural justice, is because the legislation does not run counter to the government’s understanding of its relationship to information. Authoritarian regimes, without fail, lay claim on a general right to information (which the Anti-Terrorism Legislation legitimizes). This is in contrast to a more difficult process in adopting anti-terrorism measures is within liberal democracies because the Anti-Terrorism Legislation creates the general right, instead of reinforcing it.
The shift in a liberal democratic government’s right to information, coupled with technological advances; represent the most troubling aspect of the anti-terrorist legislation. This is because of the great difficulty in shifting from a general claim to information back to a system of specific claims. This is in contrast to the relatively ease to reverse the provisions that limit personal freedom and procedural fairness, where a legislative initiative is enough to reverse the provisions. It is a significantly different story when it comes to data-bases and data-mining technologies. The creation of the databases by corporations and governments are difficult to destroy because of the tendency of government to keep records. The creation of data-mining processes, as a respond to the anti-terrorism program, is impossible to destroy altogether; due to the fact that they are mostly owned by private corporations.
While the passionate feeling within government, the lead to the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, may mellow with the passage of time; the creation of data compilation, mining, and analysis technologies means that at the next time there is a shock to the system, the process for invasion into the privacy of citizens could advance at a much quicker pace. The ability to rapidly deploy such technology will most likely result in significant additional pressure for policy makers to ‘rally around the flag’ and limit the time available for meaningful debate.
In conclusion, the anti-terrorism program has had a permanent impact on the ability of government to access personal information. This change, along with the shock of September 11th, shifted governments claim to information. This shift, from a specific to a general claim to information, is articulated in the state’s anti-terrorist program. The technological shift, both before the shock and after, had had significant impact on the debate and future action. The shift in the governments understanding of its relationship to personal information should be a dominant concern for all citizens within a liberal democratic state.
Works Cited List
Oakes, C. (2000) "Privacy Protocol Lauded, Sort Of" Wired, 28 Feb 2008 accessible at: http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2000/06/37145
Riley, T (2007). "Security vs. Privacy: A Comparative Analysis of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States" Journal of Business and Public Policy (Vol 1(2))
Whitaker, B.E. (2007). "Exporting the Patriot Act: democracy and the 'war on terror' in the Third World" Third World Quarterly, 28:5, 1017 - 1032
The focus of this post is on the government’s conception of privacy, in particular, its relationship to personal relations. Thomas Riley’s article “Security vs. Privacy: A Comparative Analysis of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States” demonstrates that significant changes has occurred in this relationship due to the Anti-Terrorism program. Riley argues that there has been significant shift in the respective government’s perspective towards security at the expense of privacy. In an extensive catalogue of legislative programs, surveillance improvements, and programs, Riley demonstrates the impact of the anti-terrorism program on the citizens’ privacy. The article’s main weakness is that it fails to acknowledge the shift in the general understanding of privacy prior to the anti-terrorism program.
Riley's analysis of privacy and security portrays privacy as the dependent variable of security. While Riley acknowledges that September 11th drove up the demand for surveillance (and analysis) technology (Riley 2007, 3), he undervalues pre-September 11th technological advances and its effect on the understanding of privacy. Prior to September 11th, 2001, the development of the Internet, and other communications advancements, has shifted the cost-benefit calculations of citizens (especially those in developed economies). By the late 90's, it was general knowledge that the ability to track a person's browsing history by internet service providers (ISPs) existed (Oakes 2000).
The benefit offered by the Internet, however, offsets the cost of possible discovery of one's browsing history (as seen by the exponential growth in internet usage). The ability to maintain massive databases and efficient search capabilities made the possibility of data-sharing possible. The development of the ability to track one's browsing history shifted the understanding of privacy from banning the government actively seeking information (since collection of such data was done by businesses) to providing the proper checks and balances for government to accessing the documents collected by the companies.
This shift, from preventing the creation of a database of personal information to regulating its access by government official, is a dynamic that occurred before the September 11th and is important to the context of the current debate. Riley’s conception of a continuum, where security and privacy represent the two poles fails to capture the dynamic within the understanding of privacy. The debate over the limits of employing data-mining technique as opposed to the creation of data-mining capabilities is representative of this change. The latter debate was circumvented by the technological advances made prior to the anti-terrorism program.
The impact of technology does not overshadow the impact of the shock of terrorism on the debate, in the short run. There is no doubt that the events of September 11th have had a huge impact on the debate between security and privacy, but the changes in technological advances paved the way for the current debate. It is because of the changing understanding of privacy, triggered by technological advance, that the internal shift in the government’s understanding of its relation to information is obscured.
Prior to the anti-terrorism legislation, the government only had the ability to access personal information with appropriate, and adequate, reason. Generally speaking, there is a judicial evaluation of the reason and the bar set for access is relatively strenuous. The anti-terrorism legislation changes that by providing a general reason, the prevention of terrorist acts that authorizes the government to access a wide range of information; furthermore, the legislation generally moves the judicial component from gate-keeper to ex post facto overseer. The legislation removes the burden on the government to provide specific rational to access relevant information. The government’s specific burden has been replaced by a general rationale, combating terrorism, to justify access to wide range of information.
This shift from the government being required to have specific evidence against specific target for access to information to being required to have neither specific evidence nor targets to access information has clearly manifested in some of the anti-terrorist programs proposed by the US. The proposed Terrorism and Information Planning System (TIPS) is a prime example of the new understanding. TIPS was a program which proposed to recruit citizens would have access to other people’s property (i.e. mailman, cable maintenance workers) to report suspicious activity. The shift from specific to general also occurred in the informant recruitment process. Whereas before the anti-terrorism program specific informants were sought out for specific targets, TIPS proposed a general recruitment (up to 10 million informants in the pilot project alone). Its fundamental premise is that the general reason of preventing terrorism was adequate to infringe on the right of individuals to privacy.
The shift is alarming for liberal democracies because the difference in the government’s right to individual’s information is a distinguishing trait between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. The shift from specific to general is symptomatic of a general shift towards authoritarian tendencies. Authoritarian regimes lays claim to all information, and results in a lack of respect for the privacy of the people. The anti-terrorism legislation shifts liberal democratic governments into this area. This is especially apparent when one considers the length of time it takes for authoritarian regimes to establish (per UN Security Council regulations) anti-terrorist legislation.
Whitaker, in “Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the War on Terror in the Third World”, notes that authoritarian regimes have a significantly easier time implementing anti-terrorist legislation than democratic regimes (Whitaker 2007). This is because there is very little substantive change by implementing the Anti-Terrorist Legislation within authoritarian regimes. The ease experienced by authoritarian regimes in adopting anti-terrorism legislation, aside from the lack of procedural justice, is because the legislation does not run counter to the government’s understanding of its relationship to information. Authoritarian regimes, without fail, lay claim on a general right to information (which the Anti-Terrorism Legislation legitimizes). This is in contrast to a more difficult process in adopting anti-terrorism measures is within liberal democracies because the Anti-Terrorism Legislation creates the general right, instead of reinforcing it.
The shift in a liberal democratic government’s right to information, coupled with technological advances; represent the most troubling aspect of the anti-terrorist legislation. This is because of the great difficulty in shifting from a general claim to information back to a system of specific claims. This is in contrast to the relatively ease to reverse the provisions that limit personal freedom and procedural fairness, where a legislative initiative is enough to reverse the provisions. It is a significantly different story when it comes to data-bases and data-mining technologies. The creation of the databases by corporations and governments are difficult to destroy because of the tendency of government to keep records. The creation of data-mining processes, as a respond to the anti-terrorism program, is impossible to destroy altogether; due to the fact that they are mostly owned by private corporations.
While the passionate feeling within government, the lead to the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, may mellow with the passage of time; the creation of data compilation, mining, and analysis technologies means that at the next time there is a shock to the system, the process for invasion into the privacy of citizens could advance at a much quicker pace. The ability to rapidly deploy such technology will most likely result in significant additional pressure for policy makers to ‘rally around the flag’ and limit the time available for meaningful debate.
In conclusion, the anti-terrorism program has had a permanent impact on the ability of government to access personal information. This change, along with the shock of September 11th, shifted governments claim to information. This shift, from a specific to a general claim to information, is articulated in the state’s anti-terrorist program. The technological shift, both before the shock and after, had had significant impact on the debate and future action. The shift in the governments understanding of its relationship to personal information should be a dominant concern for all citizens within a liberal democratic state.
Works Cited List
Oakes, C. (2000) "Privacy Protocol Lauded, Sort Of" Wired, 28 Feb 2008 accessible at: http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2000/06/37145
Riley, T (2007). "Security vs. Privacy: A Comparative Analysis of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States" Journal of Business and Public Policy (Vol 1(2))
Whitaker, B.E. (2007). "Exporting the Patriot Act: democracy and the 'war on terror' in the Third World" Third World Quarterly, 28:5, 1017 - 1032
Thursday, February 21, 2008
The Perceived Risk of Terrorism in the U.S and Canada Compared to Actual Incidence of Terrorist Attacks – Explanation and Implications.
The perceived risk of terrorism in the U.S and Canada affects significantly more of the population than the incidence of actual terrorist attacks. We will examine this phenomenon, discuss the reasons for excessive perceived risks and consider the implications of a high level of perceived risk.
The actual incidence of terrorist attacks in the U.S in 2002, the last year for which data is available was 36. That is 36 attacks against American interests, defined as attacks against American objects and persons. (Knight et al) The actual number of terrorist attacks on American soil was likely much lower, because any terrorist attack worldwide involving an American citizen is included in this statistic. Statistics for Canada reveal no significant terrorist attacks on Canadian soil in recent years. Worldwide statistics indicate 1,907 deaths from terrorist attacks worldwide in 2004, the last year for which data was available. Injuries from terrorist attacks numbered 6,704 worldwide. (Waxman) This represents an extremely minor number of deaths and injuries when compared to other threats. The perceived threat of terrorism in the U.S and Canada is much higher than these figures would suggest is rational. We will next examine the reasons for this disparity.
The most significant causal factor for the perceived threat of terrorism being higher than the actual risk in some countries is the incidence of terrorism in the past. Canada has not experienced a terrorist attack in recent history, and the lower perceived threat of terrorism in the population reflects this fact. In a recent survey only 13.3% of Canadians perceived terrorism as a threat to the population, and only 5.7% of Canadians perceived terrorism as a threat to them personally. (Lemyre et al) In contrast, American’s have experienced a recent terrorist attack in the September 11th attacks on the world trade center and pentagon. As expected, the perceived risk of terrorism in the U.S is significantly higher than in Canada. In a survey conducted in November 2001 50% of Americans perceived the average American as likely to be hurt in a terrorist attack within the next year. Approximately 20% of the population perceived themselves as likely to be personally hurt by a terrorist attack within the next year. A follow up survey conducted one year later, in November 2002 showed that the perception of the risk of terrorism remained high – with 19.2% of the population still perceiving themselves as likely to be personally hurt by a terrorist attack in the next year. (Schuster et al) In London, following the July 20005 bombings, a survey revealed that 86% of residents believed another attack was likely in the near future. (Rubin et al) These figures provide strong support for identifying past terrorist attacks within an individual’s home country as a causal factor to the perceived threat of terrorism.
Also deserving of mention is the role of the media in creating the perception of threat. A recent poll of Canadians found that the source most often referred to by Canadians for information on terrorism was the Canadian media. (Lemyre et al) The source least often referred to was Elected Politicians. This is likely a contributing factor to the perception of risk. Media reporting can be sensational, selective and inaccurate. This may contribute to distorted perceptions of the threat of terrorism.
The perceived threat of terrorism also varies by demographics. A recent Canadian survey conducted by Louise Lemyre et al identified women as more likely to perceive terrorism as a threat than men. A U.S survey conducted by Schuster et al found that along with women, visible minorities and those living within close proximity to past terrorist attacks were the most likely to perceive terrorism as a threat.
We have established that the perceived risk of terrorism is incongruent with the actual occurrence of terrorist attacks, as well as identifying three major reasons for this phenomenon – past terrorist attacks, media coverage and demographics. We now turn to the implications of high perceived risk of terrorism.
This perception of risk can be seen as supporting the ultimate goal of the terrorists, who use violent acts as propaganda to gain attention for their agendas. The perception that an individual or country is at risk of a terrorist attack creates a culture of fear. This supports the goals of the terrorist organization in two ways: first, it supports the terrorist organization’s goal of creating turmoil in the city or nation it’s targeting. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the perception of risk fuels media attention that serves as propaganda for the terrorist organization, helping to disseminate its message to the masses. (Nacos et al) An example of this type of reaction to a terrorist attack was the U.S reaction to the attacks of 9/11. The attacks not only created fear and uncertainty in the U.S, affecting the Government, the economy and the populace, but they also served to spread awareness of the Al Qaeda and their agenda. In his paper entitled ‘Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy, Douglas Kellner refers to the 9/11 attacks as ‘‘shocking global media events that were used by Osama bin Laden and like-minded terrorists…to pursue their respective agendas”. The media amplifies the perception of risk by running pieces that focus on the threat of terrorism and not on prevention. To quote Nacos et al in their paper entitled 'Prevention of Terrorism in Post-9/11 America: News Coverage, Public Perceptions, and the Politics of Homeland Security': “During the 39-month period we examined [following the September 11th terrorist attacks] the combined evening TV broadcasts…. Aired merely 85 stories that were specifically concerned with preventing terrorism at home. In contrast, during the same period… the networks aired a total of 373 stories that dealt with the threat of terrorism.”
In addition to the distorted coverage that terrorism receives in the media, the coverage of terrorism as a whole is dependant on recent terrorist attacks. Following a terrorist attack, media attention to the threat of terrorism increases exponentially, fuelling the public perception of risk. This is illuminated by a another quote from Nacos et al:
“About three months before the kamikaze attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, an expert commission appointed by Congress in 1999 wrote [a report detailing the threat of terrorism in the U.S]. Of the more than 1,000 newspapers published across the country, only forty-three mentioned the commission’s report—many of them in a few lines.” Following the attacks, media attention increased exponentially; despite the fact the media apparently didn’t find coverage of terrorism to be worthwhile prior.
Therefore, we have determined that the perception of risk outweighs the actual risk of terrorism, and that this perception of risk serves to advance the interests of terrorist groups. We should attempt to reduce the perception of risk of terrorism in Canada and the U.S through education about the actual risks of terrorism and how to interpret media coverage.
Bibliography
Knight, Charles, and Melissa Murphy. Trends in the Incidence of International Terror Attacks on Americans After the Cold War. Project on Defense Alternatives. Massachusetts: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #29, 2003.
Waxman, Henry A. The Bush Administration’S Data on Global Terrorism in 2005. U.S House of Representatives. Washington: U.S House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, 2005.
Lemyre, Louise, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. Lee, and Daniel Krewski. "Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada:." Journal of Risk Research 9 (2006): 755-774.
Schuster Schuster, M. A., Stein, B. C., Jaycox, L. H., Collins, R. L., Marshall, G. N., Elliott, M. N., Zhou, A. J., Kanouse, D. E., Morrison, J. L. and Berry, S. H. (2001) A national survey of stress reactions after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, New England Journal of Medicine, 345, pp. 1507–1512.
Rubin, G. J., Brewin, C. R., Greenberg, N., Simpson, J. and Wessely, S. (2005) Psychological and behavioural reactions to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005: cross sectional survey of a representative sample of Londoners, British Medical Journal, 331, p. 606.
Nacos, Brigitte L., Bloch-Elkon, Yaeli and Shapiro, Robert Y. (2008) 'Prevention of Terrorism in Post-9/11 America: News Coverage, Public Perceptions, and the Politics of Homeland Security', Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:1, 1 – 25
Kellner, Douglas. "Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy." Journal of Risk Research (2005): 25-39.
The actual incidence of terrorist attacks in the U.S in 2002, the last year for which data is available was 36. That is 36 attacks against American interests, defined as attacks against American objects and persons. (Knight et al) The actual number of terrorist attacks on American soil was likely much lower, because any terrorist attack worldwide involving an American citizen is included in this statistic. Statistics for Canada reveal no significant terrorist attacks on Canadian soil in recent years. Worldwide statistics indicate 1,907 deaths from terrorist attacks worldwide in 2004, the last year for which data was available. Injuries from terrorist attacks numbered 6,704 worldwide. (Waxman) This represents an extremely minor number of deaths and injuries when compared to other threats. The perceived threat of terrorism in the U.S and Canada is much higher than these figures would suggest is rational. We will next examine the reasons for this disparity.
The most significant causal factor for the perceived threat of terrorism being higher than the actual risk in some countries is the incidence of terrorism in the past. Canada has not experienced a terrorist attack in recent history, and the lower perceived threat of terrorism in the population reflects this fact. In a recent survey only 13.3% of Canadians perceived terrorism as a threat to the population, and only 5.7% of Canadians perceived terrorism as a threat to them personally. (Lemyre et al) In contrast, American’s have experienced a recent terrorist attack in the September 11th attacks on the world trade center and pentagon. As expected, the perceived risk of terrorism in the U.S is significantly higher than in Canada. In a survey conducted in November 2001 50% of Americans perceived the average American as likely to be hurt in a terrorist attack within the next year. Approximately 20% of the population perceived themselves as likely to be personally hurt by a terrorist attack within the next year. A follow up survey conducted one year later, in November 2002 showed that the perception of the risk of terrorism remained high – with 19.2% of the population still perceiving themselves as likely to be personally hurt by a terrorist attack in the next year. (Schuster et al) In London, following the July 20005 bombings, a survey revealed that 86% of residents believed another attack was likely in the near future. (Rubin et al) These figures provide strong support for identifying past terrorist attacks within an individual’s home country as a causal factor to the perceived threat of terrorism.
Also deserving of mention is the role of the media in creating the perception of threat. A recent poll of Canadians found that the source most often referred to by Canadians for information on terrorism was the Canadian media. (Lemyre et al) The source least often referred to was Elected Politicians. This is likely a contributing factor to the perception of risk. Media reporting can be sensational, selective and inaccurate. This may contribute to distorted perceptions of the threat of terrorism.
The perceived threat of terrorism also varies by demographics. A recent Canadian survey conducted by Louise Lemyre et al identified women as more likely to perceive terrorism as a threat than men. A U.S survey conducted by Schuster et al found that along with women, visible minorities and those living within close proximity to past terrorist attacks were the most likely to perceive terrorism as a threat.
We have established that the perceived risk of terrorism is incongruent with the actual occurrence of terrorist attacks, as well as identifying three major reasons for this phenomenon – past terrorist attacks, media coverage and demographics. We now turn to the implications of high perceived risk of terrorism.
This perception of risk can be seen as supporting the ultimate goal of the terrorists, who use violent acts as propaganda to gain attention for their agendas. The perception that an individual or country is at risk of a terrorist attack creates a culture of fear. This supports the goals of the terrorist organization in two ways: first, it supports the terrorist organization’s goal of creating turmoil in the city or nation it’s targeting. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the perception of risk fuels media attention that serves as propaganda for the terrorist organization, helping to disseminate its message to the masses. (Nacos et al) An example of this type of reaction to a terrorist attack was the U.S reaction to the attacks of 9/11. The attacks not only created fear and uncertainty in the U.S, affecting the Government, the economy and the populace, but they also served to spread awareness of the Al Qaeda and their agenda. In his paper entitled ‘Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy, Douglas Kellner refers to the 9/11 attacks as ‘‘shocking global media events that were used by Osama bin Laden and like-minded terrorists…to pursue their respective agendas”. The media amplifies the perception of risk by running pieces that focus on the threat of terrorism and not on prevention. To quote Nacos et al in their paper entitled 'Prevention of Terrorism in Post-9/11 America: News Coverage, Public Perceptions, and the Politics of Homeland Security': “During the 39-month period we examined [following the September 11th terrorist attacks] the combined evening TV broadcasts…. Aired merely 85 stories that were specifically concerned with preventing terrorism at home. In contrast, during the same period… the networks aired a total of 373 stories that dealt with the threat of terrorism.”
In addition to the distorted coverage that terrorism receives in the media, the coverage of terrorism as a whole is dependant on recent terrorist attacks. Following a terrorist attack, media attention to the threat of terrorism increases exponentially, fuelling the public perception of risk. This is illuminated by a another quote from Nacos et al:
“About three months before the kamikaze attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, an expert commission appointed by Congress in 1999 wrote [a report detailing the threat of terrorism in the U.S]. Of the more than 1,000 newspapers published across the country, only forty-three mentioned the commission’s report—many of them in a few lines.” Following the attacks, media attention increased exponentially; despite the fact the media apparently didn’t find coverage of terrorism to be worthwhile prior.
Therefore, we have determined that the perception of risk outweighs the actual risk of terrorism, and that this perception of risk serves to advance the interests of terrorist groups. We should attempt to reduce the perception of risk of terrorism in Canada and the U.S through education about the actual risks of terrorism and how to interpret media coverage.
Bibliography
Knight, Charles, and Melissa Murphy. Trends in the Incidence of International Terror Attacks on Americans After the Cold War. Project on Defense Alternatives. Massachusetts: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #29, 2003.
Waxman, Henry A. The Bush Administration’S Data on Global Terrorism in 2005. U.S House of Representatives. Washington: U.S House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, 2005.
Lemyre, Louise, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. Lee, and Daniel Krewski. "Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada:." Journal of Risk Research 9 (2006): 755-774.
Schuster Schuster, M. A., Stein, B. C., Jaycox, L. H., Collins, R. L., Marshall, G. N., Elliott, M. N., Zhou, A. J., Kanouse, D. E., Morrison, J. L. and Berry, S. H. (2001) A national survey of stress reactions after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, New England Journal of Medicine, 345, pp. 1507–1512.
Rubin, G. J., Brewin, C. R., Greenberg, N., Simpson, J. and Wessely, S. (2005) Psychological and behavioural reactions to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005: cross sectional survey of a representative sample of Londoners, British Medical Journal, 331, p. 606.
Nacos, Brigitte L., Bloch-Elkon, Yaeli and Shapiro, Robert Y. (2008) 'Prevention of Terrorism in Post-9/11 America: News Coverage, Public Perceptions, and the Politics of Homeland Security', Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:1, 1 – 25
Kellner, Douglas. "Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy." Journal of Risk Research (2005): 25-39.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
The Desire for Information and Media Compliance
Terrorism utilizes premeditated violence to communicate the discontent of a subversive subcategory of individuals. Not only does the group exhibit itself as seditious, in addition, “by actions which compel general attention” (Schmid 205) the aggressive violence raises general fear among possible targets. This fear stems from a perception of weakness in the capabilities of the government to properly control society. By attacking the potency of the government the opposition tenaciously asserts itself, and a larger scope of coverage of this behaviour allows for greater dissemination of rebellious viewpoint. Nevertheless, the treatment of deeds performed by such individuals necessarily leads to identifications. (Schmid 207) The acts may be intended as political expression, but the extent to which the coverage is objective and thorough are vital determinants for full appreciation of the subject. This paper will elaborate upon the roles and relationships between the government, the media, and their public in fostering dialogue and comprehension of threats of terrorism.
John Stuart Mill poignantly avers the exigency that liberal democracies requisite liberty of the press to fully legitimize. (Dyzenhaus 272) The fundamental conception of liberty of expression and dissemination is an ordinary directive; the justification being that increased press allows for richer discussions and better comprehension for the whole of society. Nevertheless, for a great period of time the predominant issues covered by the press were of domestic concerns. In this way, the issues addressed were within the general consciousness of the nation and were identifiable with greater ease by the audience. National and international reporting require strikingly different approaches. With regard to terrorism and terrorist cells, the issues are foreign to much of the public who have no viable means of conceiving of these indistinct facets they represent, nor the distant societies from which they emerge. The pictures strewn across front pages and television sets require captions and elaborations to make any sense to the audience. In assigning victims, culprits, and rationales, journalists construct every aspect of the issue. Thus, with regard to foreign issues, the major problem for a determined society might in fact be that there is too much “liberty of the press”. (Dyhenhaus 272) Perhaps the media are too instrumental for creating social perceptions in a world of vacillating political environments.
Mill elaborates the fundamental tenet that governments should not hamper the liberty of the press. Mill may not have conceived of a societal structure in which the government, without blatant effort, successfully employs a sous-entendu appropriation of the communiqués of the press media. In a society where the major communication of political events between the governing bodies and citizens occurs through the media, does the government unintentionally appropriate the trusted public forum?
As Johnson states, “cultural industries are simply vehicles by which the expressions of a nation’s culture are published”. (351) The government discerns the language of the subject, establishes the context of the threat, as well as the manner in which the “other” will be addressed, for example determining whether to name the opposition “insurgent, guerrilla, combatant”. Reporters are often from the same locales as the audience, with strong links to the community. Thus, cultural socialization[1] occurs naturally within the nation to create personas with similar values who can transmit and relay the news with the farthest reach and credibility. Thus, society inherently possesses mechanisms for steering the manner in which press begets manoeuvred expression and cultural renewal. The government, through its economic and political policies, determines the manner in which media personnel interpret international situations. There may exist freedom of the press, in that no member of society is blatantly constrained; nevertheless, the abilities of the press to relay the facts with not only objective factual representation, but in a thorough manner that does not succumb to cultural subjectivity may be questioned.
The public is an avid desire for information. The role of purveyor is performed by both the media and government; Lemyre’s survey demonstrates the manner in which citizens view the media as better accomplishing this task (763). Does this make the entire citizenry a mere audience? Are civic duties to engage with legislators, and legislative responsibilities to converse with constituents, demeaned to such an extent that no real interaction unfolds? While respondents “thought most frequently about a lowered sense of security and safety... they reported having thought least frequently about ... increased political involvement.” (Lemyre 763) This response to the issue appears diametrically against reason. Yet, it is comprehensible in the Canadian case which requires the media to maintain the position of primary source for citizens to assess global phenomenon. Consistently, governments are unable to ascertain what citizens deem the necessary laws to handle the possibility of threat. How must the government deal with the press, when it is seen as the most credible source? Certainly, the role of government as knowledgeable interlocutor declines in importance to the public. This is disconcerting as scrutiny of the media is placed on factual accuracy as opposed to the creation of public discourse. This may perpetuate the vague insecurity and lack of confidence felt by citizens, while also lending to why citizens viewed governments as ill prepared for possible terrorist threats. (Leymre 767) With international terrorist events, Canadians are shocked by the events, but as they are not directly implicated in the affair, continuing information is presented in a nominal manner. Canadian sentiments towards terrorist threats are not only shaped by recent political activity, nor the lack of an attack upon Canadian soil, but also by Canada’s longstanding foreign policy history. Canada’s international reputation was greatly shaped by past policies of peace-keeping and humanitarian work, such as Axsworthy’s campaign against the use of land mines. These conceptions retain a certain degree of value across Canada, despite currents foreign policy trends.
Schmid outlines three pivotal domains of reality that information passes across, from the real objective world, through the symbolic world, to the final subjective reality of the audience (208). How does the consciousness and awareness of the society develop when the media and government maintain partial control of the subject, with neither at the helm? Due to the recent emergence of terrorist threats as a global medium of communication, the formality of governmental interaction with citizens leaves legislators ill-poised to properly engage with the issues. As a result of this deficiency, the task seems to have been relegated to the sphere of the speedy sensory stimulating press media. It may be argued that terrorists activate, direct, and manipulate the media for propagandistic effect, while governments remain disadvantaged (Schmid 208). Nevertheless, reporters and correspondents are shaped by government policies, such as national education systems, and thus, report according to these values. The media necessarily portray all news events and terrorist occurrences in a manner which is not only relevant to Canada, but that also promotes nationally defined values and ideals.
Bibliography
Dyzenhaus, David and Arthur Ripstein. Law and Morality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
Johnson, A.W. “Culture and Cultural Industries”, in Trade-Offs on Free Trade. Toronto.
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, “Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks,” Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74.
Schmid Alex. “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004), pp.197-221.
[1] “the culture of a society is the whole complex of knowledge and beliefs and attitudes and practices which are embodied in the society, and in its political and economic arrangements” (Johnson 351)
John Stuart Mill poignantly avers the exigency that liberal democracies requisite liberty of the press to fully legitimize. (Dyzenhaus 272) The fundamental conception of liberty of expression and dissemination is an ordinary directive; the justification being that increased press allows for richer discussions and better comprehension for the whole of society. Nevertheless, for a great period of time the predominant issues covered by the press were of domestic concerns. In this way, the issues addressed were within the general consciousness of the nation and were identifiable with greater ease by the audience. National and international reporting require strikingly different approaches. With regard to terrorism and terrorist cells, the issues are foreign to much of the public who have no viable means of conceiving of these indistinct facets they represent, nor the distant societies from which they emerge. The pictures strewn across front pages and television sets require captions and elaborations to make any sense to the audience. In assigning victims, culprits, and rationales, journalists construct every aspect of the issue. Thus, with regard to foreign issues, the major problem for a determined society might in fact be that there is too much “liberty of the press”. (Dyhenhaus 272) Perhaps the media are too instrumental for creating social perceptions in a world of vacillating political environments.
Mill elaborates the fundamental tenet that governments should not hamper the liberty of the press. Mill may not have conceived of a societal structure in which the government, without blatant effort, successfully employs a sous-entendu appropriation of the communiqués of the press media. In a society where the major communication of political events between the governing bodies and citizens occurs through the media, does the government unintentionally appropriate the trusted public forum?
As Johnson states, “cultural industries are simply vehicles by which the expressions of a nation’s culture are published”. (351) The government discerns the language of the subject, establishes the context of the threat, as well as the manner in which the “other” will be addressed, for example determining whether to name the opposition “insurgent, guerrilla, combatant”. Reporters are often from the same locales as the audience, with strong links to the community. Thus, cultural socialization[1] occurs naturally within the nation to create personas with similar values who can transmit and relay the news with the farthest reach and credibility. Thus, society inherently possesses mechanisms for steering the manner in which press begets manoeuvred expression and cultural renewal. The government, through its economic and political policies, determines the manner in which media personnel interpret international situations. There may exist freedom of the press, in that no member of society is blatantly constrained; nevertheless, the abilities of the press to relay the facts with not only objective factual representation, but in a thorough manner that does not succumb to cultural subjectivity may be questioned.
The public is an avid desire for information. The role of purveyor is performed by both the media and government; Lemyre’s survey demonstrates the manner in which citizens view the media as better accomplishing this task (763). Does this make the entire citizenry a mere audience? Are civic duties to engage with legislators, and legislative responsibilities to converse with constituents, demeaned to such an extent that no real interaction unfolds? While respondents “thought most frequently about a lowered sense of security and safety... they reported having thought least frequently about ... increased political involvement.” (Lemyre 763) This response to the issue appears diametrically against reason. Yet, it is comprehensible in the Canadian case which requires the media to maintain the position of primary source for citizens to assess global phenomenon. Consistently, governments are unable to ascertain what citizens deem the necessary laws to handle the possibility of threat. How must the government deal with the press, when it is seen as the most credible source? Certainly, the role of government as knowledgeable interlocutor declines in importance to the public. This is disconcerting as scrutiny of the media is placed on factual accuracy as opposed to the creation of public discourse. This may perpetuate the vague insecurity and lack of confidence felt by citizens, while also lending to why citizens viewed governments as ill prepared for possible terrorist threats. (Leymre 767) With international terrorist events, Canadians are shocked by the events, but as they are not directly implicated in the affair, continuing information is presented in a nominal manner. Canadian sentiments towards terrorist threats are not only shaped by recent political activity, nor the lack of an attack upon Canadian soil, but also by Canada’s longstanding foreign policy history. Canada’s international reputation was greatly shaped by past policies of peace-keeping and humanitarian work, such as Axsworthy’s campaign against the use of land mines. These conceptions retain a certain degree of value across Canada, despite currents foreign policy trends.
Schmid outlines three pivotal domains of reality that information passes across, from the real objective world, through the symbolic world, to the final subjective reality of the audience (208). How does the consciousness and awareness of the society develop when the media and government maintain partial control of the subject, with neither at the helm? Due to the recent emergence of terrorist threats as a global medium of communication, the formality of governmental interaction with citizens leaves legislators ill-poised to properly engage with the issues. As a result of this deficiency, the task seems to have been relegated to the sphere of the speedy sensory stimulating press media. It may be argued that terrorists activate, direct, and manipulate the media for propagandistic effect, while governments remain disadvantaged (Schmid 208). Nevertheless, reporters and correspondents are shaped by government policies, such as national education systems, and thus, report according to these values. The media necessarily portray all news events and terrorist occurrences in a manner which is not only relevant to Canada, but that also promotes nationally defined values and ideals.
Bibliography
Dyzenhaus, David and Arthur Ripstein. Law and Morality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
Johnson, A.W. “Culture and Cultural Industries”, in Trade-Offs on Free Trade. Toronto.
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, “Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks,” Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74.
Schmid Alex. “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004), pp.197-221.
[1] “the culture of a society is the whole complex of knowledge and beliefs and attitudes and practices which are embodied in the society, and in its political and economic arrangements” (Johnson 351)
Good Policy Means Including More than just Public Opinion Polls: How the "indifferent" Canadian Attitude Should not be Taken Solely to Inform Policy
Although not quite comparable to the UK and US, for Canadians' the threat of terrorism entices very low levels of angst. Is it because it hasn't happened on our soil that the perceived threat of terror fails to beguile severe moral panic into the fabric of our society? Or more because Canada's neutrality rather oppresses feelings of discomfort that may realistically exist deep in the minds of those living closest to prospective targets? After reading, "Public Perceptions of Terrorism…." it was seen that although the nature of terrorism is complex, the Canadian sentiment desists from showing great public concern regarding the possibility of being the next target of terrorism (758). Resulting from the national survey of perceptions of terrorism and terrorism preparedness that was conducted in Canada in 2006, Canadians reported terrorism as a low to moderate threat to Canada, hence de-prioritizing it from the list of important risk management and public policy issues to be tackled on the federal government agenda (761). This however makes it increasingly more difficult to engage the public as an active partner in terrorism risk management (757). While laws, and policies are made a result of public pressure or as a reactionary measure to real life events, when it comes to terrorism, prevention will always be the best policy. With this mind frame at hand, this paper will discuss how depending just on the "indifferent" attitudes of Canadians to inform policy making and risk management strategies may hinder the government from creating policy that adequately protects against terrorist attacks. Inadvertently, discussing how prevention over reactionary approaches to terrorism will bode well in the long term for Canadian society by exploring examples of terrorism in London, Madrid and the USA. Finally, counter arguments will be discussed and responses to the counter arguments will be made further questioning the reliability of such a public opinion poll in informing government policies. Overall, it will be concluded that if the government wants to take public opinion about the likelihood or the risk of terrorism into account when constructing anti-terrorism policy, they cannot rely solely on public opinion polls but have to engage the public more aggressively in creating proper anti terrorism legislation for Canada.
Indifferent attitudes of the Canadian public were seen in the 2006 Survey that appeared in the Article, "Public Perceptions of Terrorism Threats…..in Canada". When people feel that the threat of terrorism is low, this can be seen as a good and bad thing. Good because the policies in place at present are satisfying the public, but bad because the policies are soo satisfying that the public feels no need to change them. This is where the problem arises. As a result of the issue of terrorism threats being regarded as relatively unimportant to Canadians, the government runs the risk of creating policies less than adequate to deal with prospective attacks on our soil, if it is to inform its antiterrorism policy and debates on these surveys. In recent years, increasing acknowledgement of terrorism as a global threat has established preparedness as a priority in public health planning in North America (756). So the Canadian "indifferent mentality" with regards to perceptions of risk to terrorism stands in sharp contrast to the rest of the western worlds obsession with human security and nation state protection. Policy makers need to do more to engage the public in discussions about risk management because it is simply not enough to take a public opinion poll which is not necessarily representative of the Canadian perspective, at face value and to react or not act in response to the outcome of such polls.
This is simply because, if complacent policies are made, (complacent because government and public are so satisfied that they feel no need to change the policies) then public engagement and perception of threat will automatically be lowered, this does not mean that the policies are optimal, but are revered as effective. This being said, the question that arises is, how can the public engage itself in informing public policy regarding anti terrorism if the public does not see terrorism as a threat? Well, there are many low cost, but effective ways to engage the public more aggressively in risk management and policy informing. Many a-times people do not place importance on issues or see them as harmful because they are unaware of the deapth or complexity of the issues. Therefore, the public may think, because the policy or legislation currently is effective, evading any problems, terrorism will probably continue to be a non threat to our society because we are prepared to deal with such issues. However, it is safe to say that a government can never have perfect policy, thus continuously asking its people to get involved in informing policy is the best way to ensure that legislation in place is in fact the most optimal. Thus, the government should look for ways to engage and educate their citizens in so that they may feel compelled to delve into the intricacies of the issue. One of the major questions that follows when one suggests action on the part of the government to get people involved in policy making, is how much is this going to cost? And, is it worth it, if the issue at hand is not worrisome to the public? To this, I would respond, yes, it is worth it as sometimes the reasons why concern is not portrayed is because the issue is not well understood. Any simple public opinion poll does not represent the majority of society and our views on terrorism.
Additionally, there are ways that the government can engage the society in being more active and learning about the deep rooted issues within anti-terrorism policy that exists in Canada. One way would be to engage our robust population of university students across Canada so that youth may have a strong say in their actual worries about terrorism, apart from just computer viruses and privacy issues that seem to pervade youth mindsets according to this same survey (768). The number of young minds in university at present is sitting at approximately close to 300,000 students of which many of them are student leaders engaged in civil discourse about a wide array of different issues. This being said, using these bright students as a resource, giving them the opportunity to participate in debate and discussion with officials and experts on this topic, they will be able to understand their own views and insight on the issue and then articulate it both policy makers and society as a whole. It will educate the growing population while informing the current government in a low cost manner of what criticism and concerns exist in society of the current legislation. Together students and faculty, with the help of student unions can get the attention of parliamentarians from around the country, to provide feedback in a number of different ways- for example, writing letters, holding debates, rallies etc, to show policy makers where young adults stand on the issue of anti terrorism policy.
Furthermore, to engage the greater public, outside of youth, local MPP's and Ward Councillors can play a huge role in facilitating risk management discussions around the country. MPP and Councillors have the power and ability to bring important issues of discussion onto the table in their community through council meetings. These meetings are a powerhouse for information. The general public comes to listen and engage in the topical discussions led by the local government leaders and representatives. In a situation like this, if the MPP's or Ward Councillors made an effort to make anti-terrorism legislation a point of debate and discussion, people would be more compelled to react and respond. However, if no compelling interest is shown by community leaders, then it would make sense that the lay person not involved in policy making or analyzing, would not be so interested in this type of a discussion because they are not being giving the motivation or encouragement to question the policies that already exist.
Therefore, the power to educate and engage rests in the hands of both education officials, and community leaders. The mindset that needs to exist in our society is one of prevention over reaction. However it is true that without some sort of indication that preventative techniques or strategies are much better than reactionary strategies, perhaps the government will be content with the current policies of Anti Terrorism. Both of the aforementioned methods of involving informed public opinion are cost conservative and thus not much money needs to be reassigned to this realm of policy work, hence not compromising finances from social welfare and other necessary aspects of society in order to educate and engage our public in informed decisions or understandings of anti terrorism laws.
Relating this back to the fact that this survey should not be the focal point of information for policy makers, it might perhaps be the case that the people surveyed had a skewed understanding of the threat of terrorism and furthermore, what exactly needs to be done to ensure that the threat of terrorism, indeed becomes nothing more than a “ moderately perceived threat”. What does this mean? Well, the worst case scenario would be to have a terrorist attack happen on our soil, and be ill prepared to handle it. This means that even in times when the public does not feel something is an imminent harm, proper preventative methods and policies need to be made to ensure that in such a case, harm reduction on our civilians would be the focus. Proper consultation needs to be conducted in order to ensure that people know the current policies and that they are aware of the potential of the threat of terrorism, even if it does not seem immediate. The non-threat that the respondents feel now, should not in fact be taken to face value. This is simply because, the more content society gets about policies, the more governments feel that they are doing the best they can to protect their people. But the catch 22 rests in the fact that feeling safe, or unconcerned, doesn't mean that the policies in place now are the most optimal- if anything- this type of attitude dissuades government officials from working harder to further analyze and critique their policies on anti-terrorism with public input, to perfectly ensure that the policies are optimal and practical enough to deal with any unforeseen situations.
More specifically, when countries are too comfortable with their policies, they become complacent, and this can be perceived as the best time for an attack to occur. This is because the policies will be long standing, and be based (if such information like that found in this survey is used) on nonchalant public opinion. This raises two main problems. First that as a result of the publics disinterest in further perfecting the current standing policies, ample time is given to the prospective terrorists to study and understand the laws and anti terrorism policies that exist in any given country, and attempt to figure out the mindset and plan of action that the government has to counter the terrorist attacks. In fact, post 9/11 talks with policy analysts, revealed that the US believed they were equipped with the proper measures to deal with such an attack. Some also believed that the risk management activities that were already in place were adequate because the public did not seem to perceive terrorism as a huge threat to their nation. Thus, it could be concluded that the government was content with the policies currently in place and thus did not engage the public in further dissection of existing policies to ensure that they were optimal until the attack actually happened. In no way am I suggesting that the attack was whole heartedly preventable, but, could more security and better aftermath strategies have been ironed out before an attack of such a large scale- definitely. This is exactly why issues that do not seem immediate, such as terrorist attacks in Canada, need to be brought to the publics attention so that more people are aware of what the current policies are and will be enticed to further clarify and perfect the current standing policies.
Second, the issue that this article fails to deal with is the fact that terrorism happens in many forms. It is not always an outsider attacking the infrastructure of a nation, it can be in house leaders of fundamentalist groups that help progress the terrorist attacks within a nation. In such a case, having public be educated about the policies that exist, and ensuring the public in itself knows that this is an important issue to tackle and reform to ensure the policies are optimal is important. If anything the aggressive involvement of the public in reforming the policy or overseeing it to assure its practicality and efficiency will act as a symbol of strength and dedication to protecting state security for the in house terrorists if they were to attack within their country. Additionally, with the rise of suicide bombers in the world, it is increasingly important to engage the public in understanding the issue and informing policy on it. I am not saying that enlisting moral panic is the best way to ensure policies are sound, but definitely, ensuring the public is informed about what is happening around them, and understanding how to protect individual and nation state safety is important, even if it means subconsciously causing panic at some level so that the public acts to reform policy if they so feel necessary.
Furthermore, it is important to look at London for example, and the terrorist attack in their tube system as well as the attack on Madrid train system to better understand the importance of engaging the public in preventative legislation reformation(756). Both of these two places believed as a result of the subtle attitudes of their public that their policies were solid and strong enough to deter terrorist attacks. However, regardless of UK’s obsession with CCTV and other modes of surveillance, one of the most busiest and prestigious cities in the word was targeted successfully. After these attacks only did the reactionary approach come into play and a reformation of the policies currently in place occurred, with the help of public input and organization. This relates back to the previous point, that such a public opinion poll in Canada will more so deter us from making optimal policy if the public is content or unconcerned about current risk of threat. Canada is no angel country, in that we too have made mistakes in our history and it would be wrong to believe that we were untouchable as a country that we do not feel enough of a threat of terrorism that would de-motivate us from ensuring strong plicy is in place to deal with issues of terrorism if need be. Moreover, even policy makers in London, Madrid and the States, must have felt that as a result of their public being complacent, and not critical of their terrorism policies, that the current legislation and risk management plans were sound and effective. The idea of prevention was possibly overridden by the idea of content and satisfaction from the public opinion.
It can be assumed that one of the main opposing arguments to encouraging public engagement to better inform anti terrorism policies will always be, that there is no need to spend time and money on fixing something that people do not perceive to be broken. Additionally, that if the general public were so concerned about the threat of terrorism, then they would take it upon themselves, as in past revolutions to bring it to the attention of the government. However this argument does not bode well in this context because the question here is not of just the indifferent attitudes being present in the Canadian population, more so it is an issue of if the public was more informed and engaged in debate about the issue, would they perhaps have a different opinion of the threats that exist around us? In the same way, fixing things only when they are broken relates back to a reactionary work plan as opposed to a preventative mindset. We should learn from London, Madrid and USA and their experiences, and ensure that our public always thinks that terrorism is an important issue to tackle, even though it might not feel in direct target of possible attacks.
Further to this, it must be noted that conducting telephone interviews of people might not be the best way to get an opinion on such an important topic- that too when the interviews were only of approx 1500 people, representing only 0.0000455% of our whole population (33 million) and including the opinions of those only over 18 (755). Having ignored many survey calls myself, I know that if I do pick up a telephone interview, and I am on a short time schedule, my answers may not be as accurate as they would have been had it been a more formalized method of consultation. Telephone interviews are too informal and are generally perceived by the public, especially the working public, to be too unimportant to hold weight as a formal public opinion poll. Additionally, agreeing to do a 35minute telephone interview where the questions could be very well skewed by the way the conductor of the interview asks the question, or how the participant understands the question is also problematic. These are two factors that inadvertently can taint the outcome of this type of public opinion poll. Additionally, the interviews were only conducted in the official languages of Canada, so French and English, leaving minorities who are unable to understand the questions properly to a disadvantage of answering something incorrectly because they simply did not understand. There are a whole plethora of problems with telephone interviews when it comes to understanding an issue of this importance. Such a topic deserves more of a formal consultation, and engagement process because multiple choice questions sometimes just do not reveal the best most intricate and complex answers that can effectively change or question current policy.
Thus taking into consideration the possible flaws of the survey, the point of not using just "indifferent" attitudes to inform solely the decisions of policy makers in anti terrorism legislation must be reiterated. Aforementioned I have discussed how harmful not knowing enough about or engaging in debate about this issue can be, and how reactionary methods of dealing with terrorism are outweighed by preventative methods. Overall it can be seen that if the government wants to take public opinion about the likelihood or the risk of terrorism into account when constructing anti-terrorism policy, they cannot rely solely on public opinion polls but have to engage the public more aggressively in creating proper anti terrorism legislation for Canada. In the same way, the public needs to be informed fully before deciding on whether or not they feel threatened by the risk of terrorism, as only after being educated about current policy can the public actually engage in an opinion poll that benefits and informs accurately the policy makers.
__________________________________
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, "Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks," Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74. [link]
Indifferent attitudes of the Canadian public were seen in the 2006 Survey that appeared in the Article, "Public Perceptions of Terrorism Threats…..in Canada". When people feel that the threat of terrorism is low, this can be seen as a good and bad thing. Good because the policies in place at present are satisfying the public, but bad because the policies are soo satisfying that the public feels no need to change them. This is where the problem arises. As a result of the issue of terrorism threats being regarded as relatively unimportant to Canadians, the government runs the risk of creating policies less than adequate to deal with prospective attacks on our soil, if it is to inform its antiterrorism policy and debates on these surveys. In recent years, increasing acknowledgement of terrorism as a global threat has established preparedness as a priority in public health planning in North America (756). So the Canadian "indifferent mentality" with regards to perceptions of risk to terrorism stands in sharp contrast to the rest of the western worlds obsession with human security and nation state protection. Policy makers need to do more to engage the public in discussions about risk management because it is simply not enough to take a public opinion poll which is not necessarily representative of the Canadian perspective, at face value and to react or not act in response to the outcome of such polls.
This is simply because, if complacent policies are made, (complacent because government and public are so satisfied that they feel no need to change the policies) then public engagement and perception of threat will automatically be lowered, this does not mean that the policies are optimal, but are revered as effective. This being said, the question that arises is, how can the public engage itself in informing public policy regarding anti terrorism if the public does not see terrorism as a threat? Well, there are many low cost, but effective ways to engage the public more aggressively in risk management and policy informing. Many a-times people do not place importance on issues or see them as harmful because they are unaware of the deapth or complexity of the issues. Therefore, the public may think, because the policy or legislation currently is effective, evading any problems, terrorism will probably continue to be a non threat to our society because we are prepared to deal with such issues. However, it is safe to say that a government can never have perfect policy, thus continuously asking its people to get involved in informing policy is the best way to ensure that legislation in place is in fact the most optimal. Thus, the government should look for ways to engage and educate their citizens in so that they may feel compelled to delve into the intricacies of the issue. One of the major questions that follows when one suggests action on the part of the government to get people involved in policy making, is how much is this going to cost? And, is it worth it, if the issue at hand is not worrisome to the public? To this, I would respond, yes, it is worth it as sometimes the reasons why concern is not portrayed is because the issue is not well understood. Any simple public opinion poll does not represent the majority of society and our views on terrorism.
Additionally, there are ways that the government can engage the society in being more active and learning about the deep rooted issues within anti-terrorism policy that exists in Canada. One way would be to engage our robust population of university students across Canada so that youth may have a strong say in their actual worries about terrorism, apart from just computer viruses and privacy issues that seem to pervade youth mindsets according to this same survey (768). The number of young minds in university at present is sitting at approximately close to 300,000 students of which many of them are student leaders engaged in civil discourse about a wide array of different issues. This being said, using these bright students as a resource, giving them the opportunity to participate in debate and discussion with officials and experts on this topic, they will be able to understand their own views and insight on the issue and then articulate it both policy makers and society as a whole. It will educate the growing population while informing the current government in a low cost manner of what criticism and concerns exist in society of the current legislation. Together students and faculty, with the help of student unions can get the attention of parliamentarians from around the country, to provide feedback in a number of different ways- for example, writing letters, holding debates, rallies etc, to show policy makers where young adults stand on the issue of anti terrorism policy.
Furthermore, to engage the greater public, outside of youth, local MPP's and Ward Councillors can play a huge role in facilitating risk management discussions around the country. MPP and Councillors have the power and ability to bring important issues of discussion onto the table in their community through council meetings. These meetings are a powerhouse for information. The general public comes to listen and engage in the topical discussions led by the local government leaders and representatives. In a situation like this, if the MPP's or Ward Councillors made an effort to make anti-terrorism legislation a point of debate and discussion, people would be more compelled to react and respond. However, if no compelling interest is shown by community leaders, then it would make sense that the lay person not involved in policy making or analyzing, would not be so interested in this type of a discussion because they are not being giving the motivation or encouragement to question the policies that already exist.
Therefore, the power to educate and engage rests in the hands of both education officials, and community leaders. The mindset that needs to exist in our society is one of prevention over reaction. However it is true that without some sort of indication that preventative techniques or strategies are much better than reactionary strategies, perhaps the government will be content with the current policies of Anti Terrorism. Both of the aforementioned methods of involving informed public opinion are cost conservative and thus not much money needs to be reassigned to this realm of policy work, hence not compromising finances from social welfare and other necessary aspects of society in order to educate and engage our public in informed decisions or understandings of anti terrorism laws.
Relating this back to the fact that this survey should not be the focal point of information for policy makers, it might perhaps be the case that the people surveyed had a skewed understanding of the threat of terrorism and furthermore, what exactly needs to be done to ensure that the threat of terrorism, indeed becomes nothing more than a “ moderately perceived threat”. What does this mean? Well, the worst case scenario would be to have a terrorist attack happen on our soil, and be ill prepared to handle it. This means that even in times when the public does not feel something is an imminent harm, proper preventative methods and policies need to be made to ensure that in such a case, harm reduction on our civilians would be the focus. Proper consultation needs to be conducted in order to ensure that people know the current policies and that they are aware of the potential of the threat of terrorism, even if it does not seem immediate. The non-threat that the respondents feel now, should not in fact be taken to face value. This is simply because, the more content society gets about policies, the more governments feel that they are doing the best they can to protect their people. But the catch 22 rests in the fact that feeling safe, or unconcerned, doesn't mean that the policies in place now are the most optimal- if anything- this type of attitude dissuades government officials from working harder to further analyze and critique their policies on anti-terrorism with public input, to perfectly ensure that the policies are optimal and practical enough to deal with any unforeseen situations.
More specifically, when countries are too comfortable with their policies, they become complacent, and this can be perceived as the best time for an attack to occur. This is because the policies will be long standing, and be based (if such information like that found in this survey is used) on nonchalant public opinion. This raises two main problems. First that as a result of the publics disinterest in further perfecting the current standing policies, ample time is given to the prospective terrorists to study and understand the laws and anti terrorism policies that exist in any given country, and attempt to figure out the mindset and plan of action that the government has to counter the terrorist attacks. In fact, post 9/11 talks with policy analysts, revealed that the US believed they were equipped with the proper measures to deal with such an attack. Some also believed that the risk management activities that were already in place were adequate because the public did not seem to perceive terrorism as a huge threat to their nation. Thus, it could be concluded that the government was content with the policies currently in place and thus did not engage the public in further dissection of existing policies to ensure that they were optimal until the attack actually happened. In no way am I suggesting that the attack was whole heartedly preventable, but, could more security and better aftermath strategies have been ironed out before an attack of such a large scale- definitely. This is exactly why issues that do not seem immediate, such as terrorist attacks in Canada, need to be brought to the publics attention so that more people are aware of what the current policies are and will be enticed to further clarify and perfect the current standing policies.
Second, the issue that this article fails to deal with is the fact that terrorism happens in many forms. It is not always an outsider attacking the infrastructure of a nation, it can be in house leaders of fundamentalist groups that help progress the terrorist attacks within a nation. In such a case, having public be educated about the policies that exist, and ensuring the public in itself knows that this is an important issue to tackle and reform to ensure the policies are optimal is important. If anything the aggressive involvement of the public in reforming the policy or overseeing it to assure its practicality and efficiency will act as a symbol of strength and dedication to protecting state security for the in house terrorists if they were to attack within their country. Additionally, with the rise of suicide bombers in the world, it is increasingly important to engage the public in understanding the issue and informing policy on it. I am not saying that enlisting moral panic is the best way to ensure policies are sound, but definitely, ensuring the public is informed about what is happening around them, and understanding how to protect individual and nation state safety is important, even if it means subconsciously causing panic at some level so that the public acts to reform policy if they so feel necessary.
Furthermore, it is important to look at London for example, and the terrorist attack in their tube system as well as the attack on Madrid train system to better understand the importance of engaging the public in preventative legislation reformation(756). Both of these two places believed as a result of the subtle attitudes of their public that their policies were solid and strong enough to deter terrorist attacks. However, regardless of UK’s obsession with CCTV and other modes of surveillance, one of the most busiest and prestigious cities in the word was targeted successfully. After these attacks only did the reactionary approach come into play and a reformation of the policies currently in place occurred, with the help of public input and organization. This relates back to the previous point, that such a public opinion poll in Canada will more so deter us from making optimal policy if the public is content or unconcerned about current risk of threat. Canada is no angel country, in that we too have made mistakes in our history and it would be wrong to believe that we were untouchable as a country that we do not feel enough of a threat of terrorism that would de-motivate us from ensuring strong plicy is in place to deal with issues of terrorism if need be. Moreover, even policy makers in London, Madrid and the States, must have felt that as a result of their public being complacent, and not critical of their terrorism policies, that the current legislation and risk management plans were sound and effective. The idea of prevention was possibly overridden by the idea of content and satisfaction from the public opinion.
It can be assumed that one of the main opposing arguments to encouraging public engagement to better inform anti terrorism policies will always be, that there is no need to spend time and money on fixing something that people do not perceive to be broken. Additionally, that if the general public were so concerned about the threat of terrorism, then they would take it upon themselves, as in past revolutions to bring it to the attention of the government. However this argument does not bode well in this context because the question here is not of just the indifferent attitudes being present in the Canadian population, more so it is an issue of if the public was more informed and engaged in debate about the issue, would they perhaps have a different opinion of the threats that exist around us? In the same way, fixing things only when they are broken relates back to a reactionary work plan as opposed to a preventative mindset. We should learn from London, Madrid and USA and their experiences, and ensure that our public always thinks that terrorism is an important issue to tackle, even though it might not feel in direct target of possible attacks.
Further to this, it must be noted that conducting telephone interviews of people might not be the best way to get an opinion on such an important topic- that too when the interviews were only of approx 1500 people, representing only 0.0000455% of our whole population (33 million) and including the opinions of those only over 18 (755). Having ignored many survey calls myself, I know that if I do pick up a telephone interview, and I am on a short time schedule, my answers may not be as accurate as they would have been had it been a more formalized method of consultation. Telephone interviews are too informal and are generally perceived by the public, especially the working public, to be too unimportant to hold weight as a formal public opinion poll. Additionally, agreeing to do a 35minute telephone interview where the questions could be very well skewed by the way the conductor of the interview asks the question, or how the participant understands the question is also problematic. These are two factors that inadvertently can taint the outcome of this type of public opinion poll. Additionally, the interviews were only conducted in the official languages of Canada, so French and English, leaving minorities who are unable to understand the questions properly to a disadvantage of answering something incorrectly because they simply did not understand. There are a whole plethora of problems with telephone interviews when it comes to understanding an issue of this importance. Such a topic deserves more of a formal consultation, and engagement process because multiple choice questions sometimes just do not reveal the best most intricate and complex answers that can effectively change or question current policy.
Thus taking into consideration the possible flaws of the survey, the point of not using just "indifferent" attitudes to inform solely the decisions of policy makers in anti terrorism legislation must be reiterated. Aforementioned I have discussed how harmful not knowing enough about or engaging in debate about this issue can be, and how reactionary methods of dealing with terrorism are outweighed by preventative methods. Overall it can be seen that if the government wants to take public opinion about the likelihood or the risk of terrorism into account when constructing anti-terrorism policy, they cannot rely solely on public opinion polls but have to engage the public more aggressively in creating proper anti terrorism legislation for Canada. In the same way, the public needs to be informed fully before deciding on whether or not they feel threatened by the risk of terrorism, as only after being educated about current policy can the public actually engage in an opinion poll that benefits and informs accurately the policy makers.
__________________________________
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, "Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks," Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74. [link]
Is Perception Reality?: Public Perception of Terrorism and Management of Terrorism Risks
To what extent, if any, should public perception of terrorism influence Canada’s management of terrorism risks? Some argue that understanding public perception is “an integral component of public and population health risk management decision making” (Lemyre et al 2006: 756). Others contend that an empirical understanding, and not public perception, of terrorism risks should guide decision making. To be sure, an analysis of how Canadians perceive terrorism risks reveals interesting and useful insights. Nonetheless, the conditions under which decision makers may legitimately and productively use such information are limited. The discussion below outlines some issues that emerge in the process of using data about public perception for management of terrorism risks.
Risk versus Security
It would be useful to begin our discussion by drawing a distinction between the concepts of risk and security. Risk is defined as “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen” (Oxford Dictionary 2008). Risk so defined is minimally influenced by personal feelings and emotions (which is not to suggest that it is devoid of such influences). This is the objective sense in which the term appears in discourse about risk management. Terrorism risk may be understood as the expected threat of a terrorist act, even though there remains significant uncertainty about the likelihood and consequences of terrorist acts (Lemyre et al 2006: 756). Understanding terrorism risks may enable decision makers to predict, prepare for, and even prevent future terrorist attacks.
Security is defined as “the state of feeling safe, stable and free from fear” (Oxford Dictionary 2008). Security so defined is primarily influenced by personal feelings and emotions. This is the subjective sense in which security appears in discourse about risk management. Understanding public perception of terrorism can help decision makers determine whether a population feels secure. Research about public perception informs us primarily about public’s sense of security, and not necessarily about terrorism risks. Our discussion will later consider how the subjectivity of public perception may diminish its utility for risk management.
Implications of Public Perception
Public perception of terrorism has a number of implications for risk management and communication, and public’s terrorism preparedness. For instance, a study on Canadians’ perception of terrorism risks found that “Canadians do not consider terrorism to be a large threat to the Canadian public, nor do they perceive it as a great threat to themselves.” If Canadians perceive terrorism risks as being insignificant, then public’s motivation toward independent preparedness may be difficult to mobilize (Lemyre et al 2006: 767). On the other hand, if Canadians perceive risks as being very significant, then such perceptions may lead to adverse effects on psychological well being, the economy, et cetera (Lemyre et al 2006: 757). This raises a philosophical question about whether there could be an ideal state of perceived risk, which would both best facilitate risk management and minimize any adverse effects. In any case, public perception of terrorism merits critical attention due to its considerable, although not unlimited, relevance for risk management and communication.
As stated above, perceptions may have indirect effects on psychological well being, the economy, et cetera (Lemyre et al 2006: 757). If terrorism is understood primarily in terms of propaganda that seeks “to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience” (Schmid Alex 2004: 205-207), then data about public perception may also influence future terrorist acts. Conceivably, such information is more useful for terrorists, who seek in to diminish the public’s sense of security, than for risk management decision makers, who seek to prepare for and prevent future terrorist attacks. It is sobering to imagine terrorists using knowledge about Canadians’ fears to make strategic decisions about when, where, and how to act. When negotiated with the desire for enhanced transparency and dialogue in risk management (Lemyre et all 2006: 757), this hypothetical scenario does not justify censorship of information about public perception. Nonetheless, it shows that such information may be used in problematic ways. As we will see, even risk management decision makers may use such data in illegitimate and unproductive ways. Prior to that discussion, we should consider how factors largely unrelated to terrorism risks may influence public perception of terrorism.
Limitations of Public Perception
The subjectivity of public perception may diminish some of its utility for risk management. As stated above, research about public perception of terrorism informs us primarily about public’s sense of security, and not necessarily about terrorism risks. This fact may reduce, although not eliminate, its usefulness for those decision makers who seek to prevent future terrorist acts. Furthermore, public’s perception of terrorism risks and feelings of fear and security may be misguided or unwarranted. Perceptions are influenced by a number of information sources, such as media and politicians, which should help nuance our perspectives, but too often lead us toward an unwarranted sense of fear or security. Perceptions are also shaped through a series of psychological and sociological phenomena, such as proximity to a previous terrorist act or tendency for people to perceive themselves as invulnerable (Lemyre et al 2006: 767-768), which may help facilitate irrational perceptions of risk. In a Canadian study, significant gender differences in perception of terrorism were observed (Lemyre et al 2006: 767), which raises a broader question about whose perspective matters most in risk management. Finally, there are a number of limitations related to research methodology, particularly given the complexity of subject matter, which may render findings of some studies about public perception suspect.
Nonetheless, information about public perception should not be regarded as being irrelevant. Inasmuch as public perception helps shape terrorism risks, an understanding of public perception is critical to risk management. For instance, if terrorists indeed consider public perception in the process of planning their acts, then our decision makers should take this information into account. There are a number of conditions under which the use of information about public perception is both legitimate and productive. On the other hand, some uses of such information are questionable, if not altogether unjustified. The remainder of our discussion will look at a few justified and problematic uses of data about public perception.
Uses of Public Perception
There are a number of justified uses of information about public perception, particularly in regard to risk communication. Decision makers in Canada, where public’s motivation toward individual preparedness is difficult to mobilize, may develop risk communication strategies to increase motivation. However, doing so effectively without raising the fears of the population, which may in turn produce other adverse effects, is challenging. Nonetheless, observations about how Canadian populations perceive risk may be used to present the need for preparedness (Lemyre et al 2006: 767-768), so long as information is presented in a non-essentialist manner. Since fear for the well being of loved ones and the notion of “civic duty” are effective motivators, emphasizing benefits of individual preparedness for family members and the public may be particularly effective for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism preparedness (Lemyre et al 2006: 768). Terrorism risks that Canadians have thought of more frequently may also be used to educate about CBRN terrorism (Lemyre et al 2006: 769). In these ways, decision makers may use data about public perception to engage their public in risk management.
Whether or not they are justified, unproductive and illegitimate uses of information about public perception are problematic. These include uses of data about public perception that are based on essentialist understandings about gender, race, class, nationality, religion, et cetera. For instance, the fact that Canadian women report greater feelings of threat and worry than men should be considered in light of men’s tendency to underreport levels of threat and worry in surveys (Lemyre et al 2006: 767, 769). Decision makers who, whether intentionally or otherwise, fail to understand findings within their appropriate social contexts may produce ineffective, even discriminatory, strategies. Decision makers who seek to manipulate public perception in order to advance their own propaganda may also illegitimately use research findings. For instance, making targeted rather than massive investments in risk management because Canadians would perceive them as being more necessary (Lemyre et al 2006: 767), especially when the level of terrorism risk calls for massive investments, may constitute an illegitimate use of decision making power. While some politicians may defend such actions based on the psychological and economic benefits of public’s security, such a view will fail to consider the potential harms of a false sense of security.
The above discussion has argued for a careful understanding of public perception of terrorism. Such perceptions have a number of implications for risk management and communication, and public’s terrorism preparedness. They may also have indirect effects on public's psychological well being, the economy, et cetera. Some uses of information about public perception are legitimate and productive, while others are questionable, if not altogether unjustified. Given the implications and limitations of public perception, it is important to think about what kinds of information and what kinds of uses are appropriate.
References
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, “Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks,” Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74.
P. Schmid Alex, “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004), pp.197-221.
Risk versus Security
It would be useful to begin our discussion by drawing a distinction between the concepts of risk and security. Risk is defined as “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen” (Oxford Dictionary 2008). Risk so defined is minimally influenced by personal feelings and emotions (which is not to suggest that it is devoid of such influences). This is the objective sense in which the term appears in discourse about risk management. Terrorism risk may be understood as the expected threat of a terrorist act, even though there remains significant uncertainty about the likelihood and consequences of terrorist acts (Lemyre et al 2006: 756). Understanding terrorism risks may enable decision makers to predict, prepare for, and even prevent future terrorist attacks.
Security is defined as “the state of feeling safe, stable and free from fear” (Oxford Dictionary 2008). Security so defined is primarily influenced by personal feelings and emotions. This is the subjective sense in which security appears in discourse about risk management. Understanding public perception of terrorism can help decision makers determine whether a population feels secure. Research about public perception informs us primarily about public’s sense of security, and not necessarily about terrorism risks. Our discussion will later consider how the subjectivity of public perception may diminish its utility for risk management.
Implications of Public Perception
Public perception of terrorism has a number of implications for risk management and communication, and public’s terrorism preparedness. For instance, a study on Canadians’ perception of terrorism risks found that “Canadians do not consider terrorism to be a large threat to the Canadian public, nor do they perceive it as a great threat to themselves.” If Canadians perceive terrorism risks as being insignificant, then public’s motivation toward independent preparedness may be difficult to mobilize (Lemyre et al 2006: 767). On the other hand, if Canadians perceive risks as being very significant, then such perceptions may lead to adverse effects on psychological well being, the economy, et cetera (Lemyre et al 2006: 757). This raises a philosophical question about whether there could be an ideal state of perceived risk, which would both best facilitate risk management and minimize any adverse effects. In any case, public perception of terrorism merits critical attention due to its considerable, although not unlimited, relevance for risk management and communication.
As stated above, perceptions may have indirect effects on psychological well being, the economy, et cetera (Lemyre et al 2006: 757). If terrorism is understood primarily in terms of propaganda that seeks “to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience” (Schmid Alex 2004: 205-207), then data about public perception may also influence future terrorist acts. Conceivably, such information is more useful for terrorists, who seek in to diminish the public’s sense of security, than for risk management decision makers, who seek to prepare for and prevent future terrorist attacks. It is sobering to imagine terrorists using knowledge about Canadians’ fears to make strategic decisions about when, where, and how to act. When negotiated with the desire for enhanced transparency and dialogue in risk management (Lemyre et all 2006: 757), this hypothetical scenario does not justify censorship of information about public perception. Nonetheless, it shows that such information may be used in problematic ways. As we will see, even risk management decision makers may use such data in illegitimate and unproductive ways. Prior to that discussion, we should consider how factors largely unrelated to terrorism risks may influence public perception of terrorism.
Limitations of Public Perception
The subjectivity of public perception may diminish some of its utility for risk management. As stated above, research about public perception of terrorism informs us primarily about public’s sense of security, and not necessarily about terrorism risks. This fact may reduce, although not eliminate, its usefulness for those decision makers who seek to prevent future terrorist acts. Furthermore, public’s perception of terrorism risks and feelings of fear and security may be misguided or unwarranted. Perceptions are influenced by a number of information sources, such as media and politicians, which should help nuance our perspectives, but too often lead us toward an unwarranted sense of fear or security. Perceptions are also shaped through a series of psychological and sociological phenomena, such as proximity to a previous terrorist act or tendency for people to perceive themselves as invulnerable (Lemyre et al 2006: 767-768), which may help facilitate irrational perceptions of risk. In a Canadian study, significant gender differences in perception of terrorism were observed (Lemyre et al 2006: 767), which raises a broader question about whose perspective matters most in risk management. Finally, there are a number of limitations related to research methodology, particularly given the complexity of subject matter, which may render findings of some studies about public perception suspect.
Nonetheless, information about public perception should not be regarded as being irrelevant. Inasmuch as public perception helps shape terrorism risks, an understanding of public perception is critical to risk management. For instance, if terrorists indeed consider public perception in the process of planning their acts, then our decision makers should take this information into account. There are a number of conditions under which the use of information about public perception is both legitimate and productive. On the other hand, some uses of such information are questionable, if not altogether unjustified. The remainder of our discussion will look at a few justified and problematic uses of data about public perception.
Uses of Public Perception
There are a number of justified uses of information about public perception, particularly in regard to risk communication. Decision makers in Canada, where public’s motivation toward individual preparedness is difficult to mobilize, may develop risk communication strategies to increase motivation. However, doing so effectively without raising the fears of the population, which may in turn produce other adverse effects, is challenging. Nonetheless, observations about how Canadian populations perceive risk may be used to present the need for preparedness (Lemyre et al 2006: 767-768), so long as information is presented in a non-essentialist manner. Since fear for the well being of loved ones and the notion of “civic duty” are effective motivators, emphasizing benefits of individual preparedness for family members and the public may be particularly effective for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism preparedness (Lemyre et al 2006: 768). Terrorism risks that Canadians have thought of more frequently may also be used to educate about CBRN terrorism (Lemyre et al 2006: 769). In these ways, decision makers may use data about public perception to engage their public in risk management.
Whether or not they are justified, unproductive and illegitimate uses of information about public perception are problematic. These include uses of data about public perception that are based on essentialist understandings about gender, race, class, nationality, religion, et cetera. For instance, the fact that Canadian women report greater feelings of threat and worry than men should be considered in light of men’s tendency to underreport levels of threat and worry in surveys (Lemyre et al 2006: 767, 769). Decision makers who, whether intentionally or otherwise, fail to understand findings within their appropriate social contexts may produce ineffective, even discriminatory, strategies. Decision makers who seek to manipulate public perception in order to advance their own propaganda may also illegitimately use research findings. For instance, making targeted rather than massive investments in risk management because Canadians would perceive them as being more necessary (Lemyre et al 2006: 767), especially when the level of terrorism risk calls for massive investments, may constitute an illegitimate use of decision making power. While some politicians may defend such actions based on the psychological and economic benefits of public’s security, such a view will fail to consider the potential harms of a false sense of security.
The above discussion has argued for a careful understanding of public perception of terrorism. Such perceptions have a number of implications for risk management and communication, and public’s terrorism preparedness. They may also have indirect effects on public's psychological well being, the economy, et cetera. Some uses of information about public perception are legitimate and productive, while others are questionable, if not altogether unjustified. Given the implications and limitations of public perception, it is important to think about what kinds of information and what kinds of uses are appropriate.
References
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, “Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks,” Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74.
P. Schmid Alex, “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004), pp.197-221.
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