To what extent, if any, should public perception of terrorism influence Canada’s management of terrorism risks? Some argue that understanding public perception is “an integral component of public and population health risk management decision making” (Lemyre et al 2006: 756). Others contend that an empirical understanding, and not public perception, of terrorism risks should guide decision making. To be sure, an analysis of how Canadians perceive terrorism risks reveals interesting and useful insights. Nonetheless, the conditions under which decision makers may legitimately and productively use such information are limited. The discussion below outlines some issues that emerge in the process of using data about public perception for management of terrorism risks.
Risk versus Security
It would be useful to begin our discussion by drawing a distinction between the concepts of risk and security. Risk is defined as “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen” (Oxford Dictionary 2008). Risk so defined is minimally influenced by personal feelings and emotions (which is not to suggest that it is devoid of such influences). This is the objective sense in which the term appears in discourse about risk management. Terrorism risk may be understood as the expected threat of a terrorist act, even though there remains significant uncertainty about the likelihood and consequences of terrorist acts (Lemyre et al 2006: 756). Understanding terrorism risks may enable decision makers to predict, prepare for, and even prevent future terrorist attacks.
Security is defined as “the state of feeling safe, stable and free from fear” (Oxford Dictionary 2008). Security so defined is primarily influenced by personal feelings and emotions. This is the subjective sense in which security appears in discourse about risk management. Understanding public perception of terrorism can help decision makers determine whether a population feels secure. Research about public perception informs us primarily about public’s sense of security, and not necessarily about terrorism risks. Our discussion will later consider how the subjectivity of public perception may diminish its utility for risk management.
Implications of Public Perception
Public perception of terrorism has a number of implications for risk management and communication, and public’s terrorism preparedness. For instance, a study on Canadians’ perception of terrorism risks found that “Canadians do not consider terrorism to be a large threat to the Canadian public, nor do they perceive it as a great threat to themselves.” If Canadians perceive terrorism risks as being insignificant, then public’s motivation toward independent preparedness may be difficult to mobilize (Lemyre et al 2006: 767). On the other hand, if Canadians perceive risks as being very significant, then such perceptions may lead to adverse effects on psychological well being, the economy, et cetera (Lemyre et al 2006: 757). This raises a philosophical question about whether there could be an ideal state of perceived risk, which would both best facilitate risk management and minimize any adverse effects. In any case, public perception of terrorism merits critical attention due to its considerable, although not unlimited, relevance for risk management and communication.
As stated above, perceptions may have indirect effects on psychological well being, the economy, et cetera (Lemyre et al 2006: 757). If terrorism is understood primarily in terms of propaganda that seeks “to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience” (Schmid Alex 2004: 205-207), then data about public perception may also influence future terrorist acts. Conceivably, such information is more useful for terrorists, who seek in to diminish the public’s sense of security, than for risk management decision makers, who seek to prepare for and prevent future terrorist attacks. It is sobering to imagine terrorists using knowledge about Canadians’ fears to make strategic decisions about when, where, and how to act. When negotiated with the desire for enhanced transparency and dialogue in risk management (Lemyre et all 2006: 757), this hypothetical scenario does not justify censorship of information about public perception. Nonetheless, it shows that such information may be used in problematic ways. As we will see, even risk management decision makers may use such data in illegitimate and unproductive ways. Prior to that discussion, we should consider how factors largely unrelated to terrorism risks may influence public perception of terrorism.
Limitations of Public Perception
The subjectivity of public perception may diminish some of its utility for risk management. As stated above, research about public perception of terrorism informs us primarily about public’s sense of security, and not necessarily about terrorism risks. This fact may reduce, although not eliminate, its usefulness for those decision makers who seek to prevent future terrorist acts. Furthermore, public’s perception of terrorism risks and feelings of fear and security may be misguided or unwarranted. Perceptions are influenced by a number of information sources, such as media and politicians, which should help nuance our perspectives, but too often lead us toward an unwarranted sense of fear or security. Perceptions are also shaped through a series of psychological and sociological phenomena, such as proximity to a previous terrorist act or tendency for people to perceive themselves as invulnerable (Lemyre et al 2006: 767-768), which may help facilitate irrational perceptions of risk. In a Canadian study, significant gender differences in perception of terrorism were observed (Lemyre et al 2006: 767), which raises a broader question about whose perspective matters most in risk management. Finally, there are a number of limitations related to research methodology, particularly given the complexity of subject matter, which may render findings of some studies about public perception suspect.
Nonetheless, information about public perception should not be regarded as being irrelevant. Inasmuch as public perception helps shape terrorism risks, an understanding of public perception is critical to risk management. For instance, if terrorists indeed consider public perception in the process of planning their acts, then our decision makers should take this information into account. There are a number of conditions under which the use of information about public perception is both legitimate and productive. On the other hand, some uses of such information are questionable, if not altogether unjustified. The remainder of our discussion will look at a few justified and problematic uses of data about public perception.
Uses of Public Perception
There are a number of justified uses of information about public perception, particularly in regard to risk communication. Decision makers in Canada, where public’s motivation toward individual preparedness is difficult to mobilize, may develop risk communication strategies to increase motivation. However, doing so effectively without raising the fears of the population, which may in turn produce other adverse effects, is challenging. Nonetheless, observations about how Canadian populations perceive risk may be used to present the need for preparedness (Lemyre et al 2006: 767-768), so long as information is presented in a non-essentialist manner. Since fear for the well being of loved ones and the notion of “civic duty” are effective motivators, emphasizing benefits of individual preparedness for family members and the public may be particularly effective for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism preparedness (Lemyre et al 2006: 768). Terrorism risks that Canadians have thought of more frequently may also be used to educate about CBRN terrorism (Lemyre et al 2006: 769). In these ways, decision makers may use data about public perception to engage their public in risk management.
Whether or not they are justified, unproductive and illegitimate uses of information about public perception are problematic. These include uses of data about public perception that are based on essentialist understandings about gender, race, class, nationality, religion, et cetera. For instance, the fact that Canadian women report greater feelings of threat and worry than men should be considered in light of men’s tendency to underreport levels of threat and worry in surveys (Lemyre et al 2006: 767, 769). Decision makers who, whether intentionally or otherwise, fail to understand findings within their appropriate social contexts may produce ineffective, even discriminatory, strategies. Decision makers who seek to manipulate public perception in order to advance their own propaganda may also illegitimately use research findings. For instance, making targeted rather than massive investments in risk management because Canadians would perceive them as being more necessary (Lemyre et al 2006: 767), especially when the level of terrorism risk calls for massive investments, may constitute an illegitimate use of decision making power. While some politicians may defend such actions based on the psychological and economic benefits of public’s security, such a view will fail to consider the potential harms of a false sense of security.
The above discussion has argued for a careful understanding of public perception of terrorism. Such perceptions have a number of implications for risk management and communication, and public’s terrorism preparedness. They may also have indirect effects on public's psychological well being, the economy, et cetera. Some uses of information about public perception are legitimate and productive, while others are questionable, if not altogether unjustified. Given the implications and limitations of public perception, it is important to think about what kinds of information and what kinds of uses are appropriate.
References
Louise Lemyre, Michelle C. Turner, Jennifer E. C. Lee, and Daniel Krewski, “Public Perception of Terrorism Threats and Related Information Sources in Canada: Implications for the Management of Terrorism Risks,” Journal of Risk Research, vol.9, no. 7 (2006), pp. 755-74.
P. Schmid Alex, “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004), pp.197-221.
I agree that we must tread carefully when using public perception as the basis for managing terrorism risks. However, even when the public perception minimally informs the government about actual terrorism risks, people’s feelings and emotions should never be discounted. Why? Because incorporating the public’s perceptions into our national security debate reinforces an essential democratic principle which states that people’s interests should always be given equal consideration when making collective decisions (Dahl, 1989). I do realize that people’s perceptions are not synonymous with their interests. However, in the bigger scheme of things, people’s acuities may influence their interests, and consequently affect our policy decisions. Therefore, like our interests, people’s perception should be granted equal consideration.
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, I would like to argue that public perception has a more useful purpose than just helping to shape terrorisms risks as you suggested. For instance, drawing on public perception may increase the level of citizen participation in policy debates concerning terrorism threats and risks. Moreover, since citizen participation is essential to sustaining a health democracy (Boyd, 2003), utilizing public perception is not only critical to risk management, but also critical in preventing decision makers from dominating all the decisions involved in risk management. If we don’t ask the people what they think, we run the risk of relying completely on our elected representatives, who may or may not have a hidden policy agenda.
Yes, I admit that our decision makers may have a better understanding and perception of risks because they are briefed by security watchdogs such as the RCMP, and the CSIS. Consequently, it may be easy to argue that it is the people within the government bureaucracies who should have ultimate control over Canada’s managements of terrorism risk. BUT that is not what democracy is about!
Democracy, as President Lincoln once said, “is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Boyd, 2003). Therefore, regardless of how useful public perception is, the public’s views should always be the basis or the foundation for any discussion. Even when the issue (in this case terrorism) is external to their own personal circumstances.
Ultimately, we should not be discouraged when the data on public perceptions yields no insightful or useful information, since this is not the ultimate, or should not be viewed as the only objective of public surveys. The more important or latent objective as you briefly touched upon, is to go engage people and to allow them to participate in some form of decision making.
In the end, it should not matter if public perception reflects reality (i.e. reflect the real risks associated with terrorism) or simply reflects an irrelevant belief associated with some terrorist threat. What truly matters, is that we bothered to ask people in the first place.
Works cited:
Boyd, H, L., et al., (2003). What is a health democracy ?” American Democracy at the Crossroads: Crisis and Opportunity. Retrieved Feb 20, 2008 from http://vs05.tvsecure.com/~eme357/EDemProposal/hs100.htm
Dahl, Robert, (1989). "Democracy and its Critics." New Haven: Yale University Press. Retrieved from Michigan Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 6, 1990 Survey of Books Relating to the Law (May, 1990), pp. 1662-1667